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BLOOD TEST EVIDENCE IN DISPUTED PATERNITY
CASES: UNJUSTIFIED ADHERENCE TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The number of illegitimate' births in the United States rose at an
alarming rate during the last decade. Expanded legal rights of abor-
tion2 and the use of contraceptives3 did not, as some had expected,4
curtail the proliferation of illegitimacy. By 1977 the annual number of
illegitimate births exceeded half a million.5 Several factors, including
I. The marital status of a child's parents generally determines legitimacy, although a child
may sometimes attain legitimacy even though his parents have not been married. Most statutes
expressly or impliedly refer to the time of conception in order to legitimatize a child conceived
before his parents marry. Generally, neither the parents' divorce nor the husband's death before
birth of the child affects legitimacy if the child is born within a specified time, usually ten months
or 300 days, after the marriage ends. Moreover, most states have abandoned the strict common-
law requirement that the marriage be valid, providing instead for legitimacy whenever the child is
born of a relationship that resembles a formal marriage. Thus, a child may be legitimate even
though his parents' marriage was not legal because of a failure to comply with substantive require-
ments (e.g., health checks or parental consent) or because of a legal disability to marry (e.g., incest,
nonage, insanity, or the existence of a prior valid marriage). Krause, Paternity Testing Legal
Considerations, in PATERNITY TESTING 137-38 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
3. See, eg., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
4. See Joint .4.4-.4B4 Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Drs-
puted Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 249 (1976) [hereinafter cited as AMA-4B4 Guidelines].
5. There were 515,700 illegitimate births in the United States in 1977, the first year in which
the total exceeded half a million. The number was an increase of 47,600 over the 1976 total and
represented a continuation of the steady increase in the yearly number of illegitimate births. The
following yearly totals illustrate the trend:
1977 ................................................................. 515,700
1976 ................................................................. 46 8,100
1975 ................................................................. 447,900
1974 ................................................................. 418,100
1973 ................................................................. 40 7,300
1972 ................................................................ 40 3,200
1970 ................................................................. 398,700
1965 ................................................................. 291,200
1960 ................................................................. 224,3()0
1955 ................................................................. 183,300
1950 ................................................................. 141,600
The 1977 figure was an increase of 29.3% over the 1970 total. More startling, however, were the
marked increases over the 1960 and 1950 totals--increases of almost 130% and more than 264%,
respectively. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 66 (1979).
Although the 29.3% increase during the years between 1970 and 1977 was considerably smaller
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the "new morality" and increased social acceptance of illegitimacy,6
have combined to produce record proportions of illegitimate births
each year.7 The national average in 1977 was 15.5%,' but in many ur-
ban areas the illegitimacy rate is 40%, and in some it exceeds 50%.9
The overall birth rate has declined, but illegitimacy "remains at the
level of a national crisis.' 1°
The proliferation of illegitimate births has resulted in a concomitant
increase in the number of actions"1 to determine paternity. 12 Because
he now can receive many of the legal benefits that inure to his parents,
than the percentage increase of the 1960s (77.8%) or the 1950s (58.4%), it does not actually reflect a
slowing in the growth of illegitimacy. During the 1970s the number of births per 1,000 unmarried
women was actually higher than it was during either of the two previous decades. The average
number of births per 1,000 unmarried women was 19.3 in 1955, 21.6 in 1960, and 23.5 in 1965.
During the 1970s, however, the rate ranged from a low of 24.1 in 1974 to highs of 26.0 in 1977 and
26.4 in 1970. Id Furthermore, the percentage of live births that were illegitimate continued to
climb steadily during the 1970s. See note 7 infra.
Younger women bear by far the greatest number of illegitimate children. In 1977, a year that is
representative of other years, 15 to 19 year-old women bore 234,700 illegitimate children, or 45.5%
of all illegitimate children born that year. Women 20-24 years old bore 168,600 illegitimate chil-
dren, or 32.7%. Together the two groups accounted for 78.2% of all illegitimate births in 1977.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 66 (1979).
6. AA-AB.4 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 249.
7. Illegitimate births constitute an increasing percentage of live births in the United States
each year. In 1950 illegitimate births accounted for only 4.0% of all live births, and in 1960 they
constituted only 5.3%. By 1970, 10.7% of all live births were illegitimate, and since then the per-
centage has increased gradually each year.
1972 .................................................................. 12.4%
1973 .................................................................. 13.0%
1974 .................................................................. 13.2%
1975 .................................................................. 14.2%
1976 .................................................................. 14.8%
1977 .................................................................. 15.5%
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 66 (1979).
8. Id
9. AA-4BA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 249.
10. Id
11. Usually the mother, the state, or the person acting on behalf of the child may bring the
paternity action. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 26-12-1 (1975) (mother, custodian of child, or state if
child may become a public charge); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-702 (1962) (mother); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 46b-160, -162 (1979) (mother, state, or town). Some statutes also allow the father to
bring the action. Eg., Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-843 (Supp. 1980).
12. The marked increase in paternity testings in American laboratories, see Lee, Numerical
Expression of Paternity Test Results Using Predetermined Indexes, 73 AM. J. CLIN. PATH. 522, 522
(1980), reflects the increase in the number of paternity actions. The influx of paternity cases has
come during the last five years. In 1975, for example, the Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/14
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an illegitimate child has a direct interest in achieving legitimacy 3 by
establishing the identity of his father. At common law illegitimacy was
often a basis for discrimination,' 4 but recent United States Supreme
Court decisions have established the equality of legitimate and illegiti-
mate children 5 with respect to inheritance status,16 rights to financial
conducted blood tests in 230 cases; by 1978, the number had increased to 850. Polesky, Parentage
Testing 1979, 10 LAB. MED. 601 (1979).
The 1975 amendments to the Social Security Act account in part for the increase in the number
of paternity actions. Congress provided funds for the states to establish child support enforcement
agencies that are charged with determining paternity in order to shift the support burden from the
state to the child's father. In most situations the mother must cooperate with the agency by nam-
ing the father in order to receive the full amount of benefits provided under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B) (1976).
13. Camden County Bd. of Social Servs. v. Kellner, No. DR-466-76 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rei.
Ct. Camden County Jan. 28, 1980).
14. "For centuries the concept of 'bastardy' was a convenient means of assuring inheritance
of title and property only by offspring conceived within the confines of a marital bond." Polesky,
supra note 12, at 601. At common law, an illegitimate child had few, if any, rights. "[O]ur law
... traditionally has all but denied the existence" of an illegitimate child's father. AM,4-,4BA
Guidelines, supra note 4, at 250. Notwithstanding a series of recent Supreme Court decisions
finding expanded rights for illegitimate children, see notes 16-20 infra and accompanying text,
"most states have continued to discriminate heavily in the substantive relationship between father
and illegitimate child" as to "rights of support, inheritance, custody, name, and claims under
father-related welfare statutes, such as workmen's compensation, wrongful death, and various fed-
eral acts." AM-,4ABA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 250. Furthermore, the Court's decisions are at
best confusing and often contradictory. See notes 16, 20 infra and accompanying text.
15. For an excellent discussion of the Court's treatment of the illegitimacy problem, see
Clark, Constitutional Protection of the Illegitimate Child?, 12 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 383 (1979). See
also Krause, EqualProtectionfor the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1967); Note, Illegitimates
and Equal Protection, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 543 (1977).
16. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). The Court held unconstitutional an Illinois
statute allowing illegitimate children to inherit only from their mothers. Under Illinois law, legiti-
mate children could inherit from both parents. But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971),
upholding a Louisiana statute allowing an acknowledged illegitimate child to inherit from his
father only if the father died leaving no legitimate descendants, no parents or grandparents, and
no collateral relatives, and Lalli v. Lali, 439 U.S. 259 (1978), upholding a New York statute
providing that an illegitimate child can inherit from his father only if a court had, during the
father's lifetime, adjudged paternity during the mother's pregnancy or within two years after the
child's birth. Given the Court's inconsistent treatment of the question of inheritance rights for
illegitimate children, any predictions of future rulings "based on opinions as ambiguous as those
in Labine, Trimble and Lalli are necessarily unreliable." Clark, supra note 15, at 390.
At least one state court has declared unconstitutional a statute of limitations for paternity ac-
tions similar to the one involved in Lalli. In County of Lenoir ex rel Cogdell v. Johnson, 46 N.C.
App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816 (1980), the court said that recent advances in blood test technology
vitiate the state's need for a statute of limitations in paternity actions. Under state law, preventing
an illegitimate child from asserting paternity prevented him from receiving the support of his
natural father. Thus, the court said, the statute was not "substantially related" to a "permissible
State interest," and it therefore denied illegitimate children equal protection of the law. Id at 189,
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support, 17 recovery under wrongful death' 8 and workmen's compensa-
tion 19 statutes, and claims under the Social Security Act.2 0 An illegiti-
mate child therefore has a substantial economic interest in
documenting paternity. One commentator has suggested, however,
that the child's primary interest is in ascertaining his personal iden-
tity-with the chance that a lasting father-child relationship eventually
may develop.21
The mother and the state have interests that are principally eco-
nomic. Without assistance from the father, the mother must support
264 S.E.2d at 821. But see Thompson v. Thompson, 40 Md. App. 256, 265, 390 A.2d 1139, 1144
(1978), aft'd, 285 Md. 488, 404 A.2d 269 (1979), appeal dirmissed, 444 U.S. 1062 (1980), refusing to
strike down a similar statute of limitations:
We... agree that medical technology is, indeed, making progress in the science of
blood testing. Perhaps our technology will eventually devise a virtually perfect test for
determining one's paternity. We are not convinced, however, that day is at hand ...
Until it arrives, we do not feel that we are constitutionally required, under the less re-
strictive means theory, to strike down the statute of limitations ....
17. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds
Texas' refusal to permit illegitimate children to recover support from their fathers when legitimate
children had the right to do so. The Court said that "once a state posits a judicially enforceable
right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally
sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural
father has not married its mother." Id at 538. The same year, the Court in New Jersey Welfare
Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973), struck down a New Jersey statute limiting
welfare benefits to families composed of only married persons and their children.
18. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). The Court in Levy struck down as invidiously
discriminatory a wrongful death statute that refused to allow an illegitimate child to recover for
his mother's death.
19. In Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Court declared unconstitu-
tional a statutory payment scheme denying workmen's compensation payments to an unacknowl-
edged illegitimate child upon the death of his father unless there were too few other dependent
survivors, including legitimate and acknowledged illegitimate children, to collect all maximum
allowable benefits.
20. In Davis v. Richardson, 409 U.S. 1069, af'gmem. 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn. 1972), and
Griffin v. Richardson, 409 U.S. 1069, af'g men 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972), the Supreme
Court's summary affirmations held unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act dis-
criminating between legitimate and illegitimate children in the payment of benefits to the children
of a deceased wage earner. In Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), the Court declared
unconstitutional that portion of the Social Security Act that denied benefit payments to illegiti-
mate children born after the occurrence of the father's disability. But see Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495 (1976), which upheld a provision of the Social Security Act prohibiting illegitimate chil-
dren from claiming insurance benefits upon the wage earner's death.
21. One commentator has argued that
[plerhaps the greatest, and least understood, urgency to establish parentage is strictly
emotional. A sense of personal identity is derived, in part, from an awareness of lineage.
That half of a child's heritage which is denied at birth may be partially restored when the
parental relationship is legally established. While not assured, there is even the chance
that a genuine relationship may eventually develop between father and child.
Keith, Resolution of Paternity Disputes--Genetic Testing, 1980 CHILD SUPPORT REP., 4, 5 (April).
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the child herself. To do so she often must leave the child in another's
care. The alternative is to turn to some form of outside, usually gov-
ernmental, assistance. The state has an interest in protecting children
from the stigma of illegitimacy22 and in preserving the family,23 but its
primary interest is also largely economic. One-third of all children who
receive assistance under Aid to Families with Dependent Children are
illegitimate.24 With paternity established, the state can ensure that the
responsible individuals, rather than the taxpayers, bear this financial
burden.25 The taxpayers therefore have a "right to know who is the
father of the child or if a particular person is not the father."26
Blood testing has changed the nature of paternity proceedings and
today provides the best method for fulfilling the interests involved. Pa-
ternity proceedings once were little more than swearing contests in
which the credibility of the mother or the alleged father often was dis-
positive. The use of scientific blood test evidence, however, reduces the
subjectivity upon which the determination of paternity traditionally
has been made by providing a more objective basis for the decision.27
Although it is impossible to prove paternity conclusively, blood test
evidence, when considered in view of other evidence of the relationship
between the mother and the putative father, lends objectivity that aids
the courts in the discovery of truth and the administration of justice 2 -
which should be the goal of all paternity proceedings. 29
Blood tests also provide an added measure of protection for men
who are accused falsely by either mistake or design. An alleged father
22. Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 885, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865, 872 (1979).
23. Id at 885, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
24. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE, TEMPO No. FOUR 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as TEMPO No. FOUR].
25. Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 885, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865, 872 (1979).
26. Lascaris v. Lardeo, 100 Misc. 2d 220, 224, 417 N.Y.S.2d 665, 668 (Fam. Ct. 1979) (citing
Schleimer ex rel McCoy v. Swam, 93 Misc. 2d 520, 402 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Far. Ct. 1978)).
27. Keith, supra note 21, at 4. See note 45 infra.
28. Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super. 513, 515, 401 A.2d 279, 280 (1979).
One court has suggested that the state has a duty to use blood tests in order to ensure the
accuracy of the paternity determination. "It is in the child's interest not only to have it adjudi-
cated that some man is his or her father and thus liable for support, but to have some assurance
that the correct person has been so identified." Therefore, the court argued, "the state owes it to
the child to insure that an accurate determination of parentage will be made." Salas v. Cortez, 24
Cal. 3d 22, 34, 593 P.2d 226, 234, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 537, cer. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
29. One writer has argued that "[c]onsidering the interests at stake and the costs of an errone-
ous decision--to the parties, to society, to the integrity of the legal system--the question of pater-
nity should be dealt with empirically, as a question of genetics." 16 J. F'm. L. 537, 537 (1978).
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has an interest in remaining free from wrongly imposed financial obli-
gations, imprisonment, and injury to his reputation.30 Consequently,
the interest in avoiding erroneous imposition of the parent-child rela-
tionship is as strong as any interest that favors parental identification.3 1
A mother, however, often will accuse a man because of convenience 32
or the size of his income.33 Blood testing helps determine the veracity
of her claim34 and thus protects both a falsely accused male and the
community from fraud.35 It also saves considerable administrative, ju-
dicial, and legal expenses3 6 as well as the enormous cost of support
imposed upon an accused if he is falsely adjudged to be the father.37
30. Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Minn. 1979).
An adjudication of paternity may profoundly affect a person's life. It may disrupt an
established family and damage reputations. Further, a court's determination of pater-
nity exposes a defendant to deprivation of property and, potentially, liberty. It entails
the obligation to support and educate a child ... , an obligation that does not end at the
child's age of majority. . . .Moreover, a child support order is more freely enforceable
by garnishment than an ordinary civil judgment. . . and is not dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy .... Also, the failure to pay child support may be enforced through the civil
contempt power... as well as the Uniform Civil Liability Act. . .and interstate assist-
ance statutes. . .A judgment of paternity, even if taken by default, is res judicata in
any subsequent civil enforcement proceeding.
Failure to support a child may also be prosecuted criminally.
Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28, 593 P.2d 226, 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
900 (1979).
31. Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28, 593 P.2d 226, 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 900 (1979).
32. As a condition of receiving full assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program, federal law requires mothers of illegitimate children to cooperate with
state authorities, usually by naming an alleged father, in an effort to ascertain paternity. See note
12 supra. Requiring the mother to name an alleged father so that AFDC payments will not be
decreased or stopped increases the risk that a man will be accused falsely. Blood testing can help
expose fraudulent or incorrect accusations. Lascaris v. Lardeo, 100 Misc. 2d 220, 226-27, 417
N.Y.S.2d 665, 669 (Fam. Ct. 1979).
33. Polesky, supra note 12, at 602.
34. Fraudulent accusations are not uncommon. One study found that approximately 10% of
women who make accusations of paternity fail to appear for blood tests ordered by the court, "a
situation which must be considered suspect." L. SUssAN, PATERNITY TESTING BY BLOOD
GROUPING 139 (2d ed. 1976). Another study showed that 48% of the mothers surveyed had lied
when they denied having sexual relations with another man during the critical conception period.
Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Pro'e Paternity?, 54
N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1131, 1134 (1979).
35. Lascaris v. Lardeo, 100 Misc. 2d 220, 227, 417 N.Y.S.2d 665, 669 (Fain. Ct. 1979).
36. TEMPO No. FouR, supra note 24, at 2.
37. Blood test evidence is "conclusive, widely available, and relatively inexpensive." The
alternative, "supporting someone else's child for eighteen years," makes the cost of several hun-
dred dollars for the tests "almost inconsequential." The comparatively low cost of blood testing
thus makes "[o]bjective scientific evidence... available where economic and other considera-
tions might dictate an otherwise one-sided proceeding.' Keith, supra note 21, at 4. See also Se-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/14
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Blood tests have been used increasingly in disputed paternity cases.
Innovations in medical technology have made it possible to exclude a
falsely accused man from paternity in more than ninety-nine percent of
all cases.38 Given the high possibility that a falsely accused man will be
excluded, it is reasonable to infer that he is the true father if blood tests
fail to exclude him. It is also possible to calculate reliably the likeli-
hood that he is the actual father.39
In many jurisdictions, however, blood test results are inadmissible as
evidence unless they conclusively exclude the putative father.4° Recent
technological advances have destroyed the underlying rationale for ex-
cluding such evidence. This Note first describes two recent advances in
blood testing technology that make possible extreme accuracy in deter-
mining paternity. Second, this Note discusses the potential barrier to
the admission of those blood test results posed by stringent require-
ments for the validation of novel scientific evidence. Finally, this Note
examines the exclusionary rule, weighs the probative value of nonex-
clusionary blood test evidence and the countervailing probative dan-
gers of admitting it, and evaluates the continued need for the rule.
I. RECENT ADVANCES IN BLOOD TESTING TECHNOLOGY
Karl Landsteiner discovered identifiable characteristics in blood
when he isolated the ABO blood group in 1901.41 In 1910 van Dun-
gem and Hirszfeld laid the foundation for modem paternity testing by
proving that children inherit the ABO blood group according to the
rules of Mendelian genetics.42 Researchers have since identified sev-
eral other red blood cell antigen 43 groups.44
bring. Polesky & Schanfield, Gm and Km Alotlypes in Disputed Parentage, 71 AM. J. CLIN. PATH.
281, 281 (1979).
38. See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 210-23 infra and accompanying text.
40. See notes 175-87 infra and accompanying text.
41. 1 S. SCHAlrKuN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 5.01, at 5-1 (4th ed. 1980).
42. Silver, An Introduction to Paternity Testing, in PATERNITY TESTING vii (1978).
43. Antigens are substances on the surface of the blood cells that stimulate production of
antibodies when they are introduced into another individual. Genes produce them under genetic
control. Terasaki, Resolution By HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excludedby.4BO Test-
ing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543, 545 (1978).
44. For a good overview of the red cell antigen blood groups, see L. SUSSMAN, supra note 34;
AM,4-AB,4 Guidelines, supra note 4. See generally A. ERSKINE & W. SOCHA, THE PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF BLOOD GROUPING (2d ed. 1978); 0. PROKOP & G. UHLENBRUCK, HUMAN
BLOOD AND SERUM GROUPS (1969); P. RACE & R. SANGER, BLOOD GROUPS IN MAN (6th ed.
Number 3]
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The scientific basis for blood testing in disputed paternity cases rests
on the principles of Mendelian genetics. Blood contains a large
number of distinguishable genetic markers4" that have specific inheri-
tance patterns. Children inherit genetic markers in pairs, one from
each parent. A child cannot possess a given marker unless at least one
of his parents also possesses it. If a child has a marker not present in
either his mother or the alleged father, the accused is excluded. Simi-
larly, a child must possess at least one of the markers that his father
possesses. If at least one of the alleged father's markers is not present
in the child, the accused again is excluded.46
Most laboratories utilize six principal red cell antigen groups for pa-
ternity testing. Each of the ABO, Rh, MNSs, Kell, Duffy, and Kidd
groups produces a relatively high level of exclusion47 in relation to the
1975). The history of the discovery of red cell antigen groups is recounted generally in C. Mc-
CORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 211 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
45. Genetic markers are "personal characteristics inherited from the parents and controlled
by genes on a pair of chromosomes. Personal characteristics can be physical, such as the color of
hair, eyes and skin, or detectable properties of the blood components." Lee, Current Status of
Paternity Testing, 9 FAM. L.Q. 615, 616 (1975).
Genetic markers in the blood are readily identifiable and follow the principles of Mendelian
genetics. Tippett, Blood Group Genetics and Paternity Tests, in PATERNITY TESTING 1-18 (1978).
See generally R. RACE & R. SANOER, supra note 44. The chances of a mutation that would cause
the normal inheritance pattern to deviate are only one in every 40,000 persons, and thus they
effectively may be disregarded. AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 260. Because a child nec-
essarily must inherit genetic characteristics of the blood from his father as well as from his mother,
blood tests may be used to exclude conclusively a putative father from paternity. See generally id;
Larson, Blood Test Exclusion Procedures in Paternity Litigation The Un/form Acts and Beyond, 13
J. FAM. L. 713 (1973-74). See also note 46 infra and accompanying text. Even when an alleged
father is not conclusively excluded, it is possible to calculate the probability that he is in fact the
father of the child. See notes 210-21 infra and accompanying text. Therefore,
[t]he testing of genetic markers provides the only source of scientific evidence in legal
cases that otherwise often are decided by hearsay and perjury. It is not uncommon that
the man accused of being the father is selected because of the size of his income, or that
the defense is based on trying to show that the mother is promiscuous. Carefully per-
formed and correctly interpreted blood tests can provide proof of nonpaternity, eliminat-
ing the necessity to depend on witnesses to events that may or may not have occurred.
Polesky, supra note 12, at 602.
46. Tippett, supra note 45, at 1-2.
47. The usefulness for paternity testing of a given system of genetic markers depends upon
the probability of exclusion that the system produces. The probability of exclusion measures the
chance that testing with a given system will exclude a falsely accused man. The frequency with
which given markers occur among the population determines the probability, which usually is
expressed as a percentage. Thus, a system that has a probability of exclusion of 65% will exclude
65 falsely accused men out of 100. It does not mean, however, that there is a 65% chance that a
nonexcluded man is actually the father. See note 216 infra and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/14
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cost of analysis.48 In addition, the antisera4 9 required for testing are
reliable and readily available.50 The six systems produce a cumulative
probability of exclusion of sixty-three to seventy-two percent, depend-
ing upon race.'
Red cell antigen tests have low evidentiary utility, however, if they
fail to exclude the alleged father from paternity. Proof that testing has
not excluded the accused is logically relevant to the question of
whether he is the true father. 2 Yet because the probability of exclusion
by red cell antigen testing is not high enough to allow an accurate infer-
ence of paternity from nonexclusion, 3 the' probative danger of admit-
ting nonexclusionary test results into evidence outweighs the probative
48. AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 257. The cost of red cell antigen tests ranges from
$75 to $450 for three persons (mother, child, and putative father). See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, TEMPO No. NINE 5-21 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as TEMPO No. NINE].
The probability of exclusion for each red cell antigen group varies according to race. While the
probabilities vary for each individual system, the cumulative probability of exclusion is considera-
bly higher for white males than for blacks or Japanese. Red cell antigen testing will exclude a
falsely accused man between 63% and 72% of the time.
PROBABILrrY OF EXCLUSION OF NONFATHERS (%)
BLACK WHITE JAPANESE
System Mean Cum. Mean Cur. Mean Cum.
ABO 17.74 17.74 13.42 13.42 19.17 19.16
Rh 18.59 33.03 27.46 37.19 20.50 35.74
MNSs 32.06 54.50 30.95 56.63 25.31 52.0
Kell .49 54.72 3.54 58.17 0.0 52.0
Duffy 4.20 56.63 18.44 65.88 11.59 57.56
Kidd 15.45 63.37 18.69 72.26 15.73 64.24
AMA-ABA4 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 257-58. See also L. SussMAN, supra note 34, at 9.
49. Antisera are used to identify blood groups. Each antiserum contains an antibody that
combines with a particular antigen and causes agglutination of blood cells that contain that anti-
gen. Blood antigen types are identified by whether they agglutinate whenever their particular
antiserum is applied. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, TECHNICAL METHODS &
PROCEDURES 34-35 (5th ed. 1970).
50. AM4-4BA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 257.
51. See note 48 supra.
52. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 44, § 185, at 437: "[Ihe most acceptable test of rele-
vancy is the question, does the evidence offered render the desired inference moreprobable than it
would be without the evidence?'
53. Analysts usually consider nonexclusion by red cell antigen tests to be inconclusive. See
notes 178-81 infra and accompanying text. Red cell antigen tests produce a probability of exclu-
sion of between 63% and 72%. See note 48 supra. There is, therefore, a substantial 28% to 37%
chance that a falsely accused man may nevertheless not be excluded by red cell antigen tests alone.
See note 47 supra.
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value.54 Thus, although they recommend the use of ABO, Rh, MNSs,
Kell, Duffy, and Kidd systems,55 the American Medical Association
and the American Bar Association recommend further testing if red
cell antigen testing fails to produce an exclusion.56 Red cell antigen
testing alone "is no longer an acceptable extent of testing if there is a
failure to exclude."5 "
Research in recent years has produced two blood testing techniques
that greatly increase the accuracy of paternity determinations. The
first, human leukocyte antigen (HLA) testing, provides a probability of
exclusion greater than that of the six red cell antigen groups com-
bined.58  The other, the testing of red cell enzymes and blood serum
proteins by a method known as electrophoresis, generally is slightly less
accurate than HLA but nevertheless provides a high probability of ex-
clusion.59 Either HLA or enzyme-protein testing, when combined with
accepted red cell antigen testing, will produce a probability of exclusion
of nearly ninety-seven percent. 60 The three systems combined will ex-
clude a falsely accused man in more than ninety-nine percent of all
cases.
6 1
A. The Human Leukocyte Antigen System
Testing for human leukocyte antigens seeks to identify inheritable62
antigens on the surface of white, rather than red, blood cells. 63 Re-
54. Courts and legislatures generally have refused to allow admission of nonexciusionary red
cell antigen test results because they fear that the jury will infer paternity improperly. See notes
176-83 infra and accompanying text.
55. AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 257. The report recommends initial testing by
ABO, Rh, and MNSs. If there is no exclusion, the report recommends additional testing using the
Kell, Duffy, and Kidd antigen systems. Id at 256.
56. Id
57. Walker, Probability in the Analysir of Paterniy Test Results, in PATERNITY TESrING 95-96
(1978).
58. Compare note 80 infra and accompanying text with note 48 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 108-15 infra and accompanying text.
60. See note 114 infra See also TEMPO No. Fouit, supra note 24, at 7.
61. See TEMPO No. FouR, supra note 24, at 7.
62. Like that of red cell antigens, the inheritance of human leukocyte antigens follows the
laws of Mendelian genetics. Miller, HL4 Serotypingin Cases of Disputed Paternity, in PATERNITY
TESTING 55 (1978). See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
63. HLA technically is a tissue typing test, because the antigens it tests can be found in al-
most all bodily tissues, including the liver and the kidneys. J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d 696, 701, 285
N.W.2d 880, 882 (Ct. App. 1979). Courts differ on whether HLA testing is a "blood test" within
the meaning of statutes prescribing the scope of admissibility of blood test results. Compare id at
699-705, 285 N.W.2d at 881-84 (HLA is a "blood test," and proof of nonexclusion of putative
[Vol. 59:977
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searchers have identified a large number of white cell antigens. The
number of possible combinations of white cell antigens is so high that
only one person in a thousand has an HLA type similar to that of a
given individual.64 The "high degree of discrimination"65 of the HLA
system thus makes HLA the most accurate method available for ascer-
taining paternity.66 Its extreme accuracy, especially in combination
with accepted red cell antigen tests, has caused a "revolution" in pater-
nity testing.67
Human body cells contain twenty-three pairs of chromosomes. A
child inherits one chromosome in each pair from his father and the
other from his mother. Present on the chromosome are genes, which
determine the traits an individual will possess. A locus is the spot a
gene occupies on a chromosome.68
The HLA region is the area of the chromosome in which white cell
antigens are found. In the HLA region there are four loci, two of
which, HLA-A and HLA-B, are most commonly used in paternity test-
ing. At each locus are two genetic expressions for antigens, called al-
leles, that represent alternative gene forms occupying the same locus on
paired chromosomes.69
Considering only the HLA-A and HLA-B loci, a maximum of four
antigens can be expressed on the cell.70 The summary of the four iden-
tifiable antigens 7' is the phenotype.72 Children inherit the antigens in
pairs called hatpotfpes, which are combinations of one A locus allele
father therefore was inadmissible under statute proscribing admission of nonexclusionary blood
test results) with Phillips ex rel. Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1233
(Utah 1980) (HLA not necessarily characterized as a "blood test" and therefore did not fall within
"blood test" language of statute).
64. Terasaki, supra note 43, at 544.
65. Id at 543.
66. Jeannet, HAssig & Bernheim, Use of the HL-A Antigen System in Disputed Paternity
Cases, 23 Vox SANGUINIS 197, 200 (1972).
67. Miller, supra note 62, at 55. One commentator has said that the accuracy of HLA testing
may make HLA "the means for making the paternity action respectable." 16 J. FAM. L. 537, 541
(1978).
68. Terasaki, supra note 43, at 545.
69. Id
70. If four different antigens (two at each locus) appear, there can be no others, and there is
no possibility of missing one because of technical error. If fewer than four antigens are present,
either the available reagents cannot detect the missing antigen or the individual has identical
alleles on a given locus. Id at 545-46.
71. White cell antigens are identified by their locus, A or B, and a number--eg., A8 or B14.
72. For example, a person may possess a phenotype of A2-A6-B3-BlI.
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and one B locus allele on the same chromosome. Each person pos-
sesses two haplotypes, one inherited from each of his parents.73
The polymorphic74 character of HLA makes it extremely useful in
paternity testing. By 1976 researchers had identified thirty-nine differ-
ent antigens for the HLA-A and HLA-B loci. 75 Using only the HLA-A
antigens and fifteen HLA-B antigens, there are 6,600 possible pheno-
types.76 The number of possible combinations of antigens among the
four alleles therefore renders highly unlikely the possibility that a
nonrelated child and putative father share a common haplotype. 77 The
relative rarity of HLA antigens, 78 and thus haplotypes, 79 in the popula-
tion further contributes to the efficacy of HLA testing in the determina-
tion of paternity.
HLA testing has two major strengths. First, it can conclusively ex-
clude a falsely accused man in more than ninety percent of all cases.80
73. Terasaki, supra note 43, at 545. To illustrate, assume that a child possesses a phenotype
of A2-A6-B3-B 11, the mother a phenotype of A2-A8-B7-B 11, and the father a phenotype of A6-
A13-B3-B9. The A2-B 11 haplotype must have come from the mother, and the A6-B3 haplotype
must have come from the father.
74. Polymorphic is defined as "[h]aving different molecular forms but the same biochemical
function." Grunbaum, Potential and Limitations of Forensic Blood Analysis, in HANDBOOK FOR
FORENSIC INDIVIDUALIZATION OF HUMAN BLOOD AND BLOODSTAINS 3 n. (B. Grunbaum ed.
1980). It is important that genetic markers used in paternity testing be reasonably polymorphic.
The greater the number of variants within a particular group of genetic markers, the less likely
that two nonrelated individuals will possess the same variant.
75. AMA4AB.4 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 272. For data on the identified number of HLA
specificities and the gene frequencies of HLA antigens, see id at 273-75. Calculation of the
probability of paternity, see notes 216-21 infra and accompanying text, requires the use of
haplotype frequencies instead of independent gene frequencies. Presently, however, there is rela-
tively little information on haplotype frequencies for blacks, orientals, and American Indians, and
the information available for whites is based on comparatively small studies. Miller, supra note
62, at 64.
76. Lee, Lebeck & Wong, Estimating Paternity Index from HI-typing Results, 74 Am. J.
CLIN. PATH. 218, 218 (1980). The 6,600 figure reflects a 65% increase since 1975. In 1975, identi-
fied HLA antigens made possible only 4,000 phenotypes. H. POLESKY, PATERNITY TESTING 61
(1975).
77. Most persons possess "rare" HLA types. Only one person in 1,000 has an HLA type
similar to that of a given individual. See note 64supra and accompanying text. The chance that a
nonrelated child and putative father share a common haplotype becomes even smaller when one
considers the usually small number of possible fathers.
78. Most HLA antigens occur in fewer than 15% of the population, and all occur in fewer
than 50%. Miller, supra note 62, at 55.
79. Terasaki, Gjertson, Bernoco, Perdue, Mickey & Bond, DTvins With Two Different Fathers
Identofedby HLA, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 590, 590 (1978).
80. Miller, supra note 62, at 55.
HLA testing has become increasingly more accurate in recent years. In 1972 the chances of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/14
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If the child possesses neither of the alleged father's haplotypes, the ac-
cused obviously is not the actual father."' HLA testing has produced
exclusions even when death had rendered the mother 82 or the putative
father 83 unavailable for testing.84 Second, HLA allows for a reasonably
accurate computation of the probability that an alleged father is the
actual father 5 if the tests fail to exclude him.86 If a child possesses the
same rare HLA type as the putative father, the infrequency of similar
HLA types in nonrelated individuals makes it highly probable that the
excluding a falsely accused man by HLA testing alone was 76%. Jeannet, Hsssig & Bernheim,
supra note 66, at 197. By 1976 the probability of exclusion reached 78% to 80%. 4MA,4AB
Guidelines, supra note 4, at 258. Today, conservative estimates place the probability of exclusion
of HLA at between 85% and 91%. TEMPO No. FouR, supra note 24, at 7. Others place the figure
as high as 95%. Letter from Dr. Leon N. Sussman, Lindsley F. Kimball Research Institute of the
New York Blood Center, to author (Dec. 9, 1980) (on file with the- Washington University Law
Quarterly).
The accuracy of HLA testing varies according to race. It depends upon the racial and geo-
graphic origin of the subjects, because the frequencies of the haplotypes vary between ethnic
groups and subpopulations in various areas. .4MA4-4BAI Guidelines, supra note 4, at 276.
81. Miller, supra note 62, at 60; Terasaki, supra note 43, at 544. See notes 45-46 supra and
accompanying text.
82. Terasaki, supra note 43, at 550. Exclusion of the alleged father is possible even though
the mother is unavailable for testing if the accused man possesses none of the haplotypes that the
actual father must have. See notes 46, 81 supra and accompanying text.
83. Speiser, Exclusion ofPaternity in the HL-A System WIthout Testing the DeceasedAccused
Man, 27 Vox SANGUINIs 379, 379-81 (1974). It is possible to exclude the deceased putative father
by testing his relatives. If the putative father's parents, for example, possess none of the
haplotypes that the actual father must have, the deceased putative father could not have possessed
them and therefore could not have been the father of the illegitimate child. See notes 45-46 supra
and accompanying text.
84. In a more startling case, HLA testing showed that fraternal twins had different fathers.
See Terasaki, Gjertson, Bernoco, Perdue, Mickey & Bond, supra note 79, at 590. Proof that two
different men fathered one twin each is "striking testimony to the power of HLA typing to deter-
mine paternity." Id A third man could have fathered both twins, but the probability that a third
man was involved was only one in 140,000. Id at 591.
85. See notes 216-21 infra and accompanying text.
86. The probability is generally high. It is possible in most cases to show a probability of
paternity of more than 90%, and virtually all nonexcluded men have a probability of paternity
greater than 85%. Miller, supra note 62, at 55. It would be virtually impossible to achieve such
probabilities with conventional red cell antigen testing, Terasaki, supra note 43, at 552, because
the small number of variables involved in red cell antigen testing makes possible a probability of
paternity of only 50% to 60%, Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 878, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865,
867 (1979). In Professor Terasaki's survey of 1,000 cases, 25% of the 1,000 putative fathers were
excluded conclusively. Testing showed with a probability of 90% or more that 64% were the ac-
tual fathers; of those, the probability of paternity for 16% was 99-100%, and the probability for
another 15% was 98-99%. Only 10% of the cases were inconclusive. Terasaki, supra note 43, at
552.
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accused man is actually the father.8 7
Although its low error rate makes the HLA system a reliable pater-
nity testing method88 that several laboratories now perform,8 9 HLA has
a number of disadvantages. White blood cells are less stable than are
red cells. Because fresh white cells are necessary for HLA testing,90 the
analyst must perform the tests within twenty-four hours after sam-
pling.9 The instability of white cells, especially at extreme tempera-
87. Terasaki, supra note 43, at 544. Given the rarity of HLA antigens and haplotypes, see
notes 75-79 supra and accompanying text, the presence of a haplotype in both the child and the
putative father provides presumptive evidence of paternity. Miller, supra note 62, at 60. At least
it implies, and usually produces, a high probability of paternity. See note 86 supra.
For example, suppose that the mother has a phenotype of Al-A3-B7-B8; the child a phenotype
of Al-All-B8-B12; putative father A a phenotype of Al-A3-BI4-BI7; and putative father B a
phenotype ofAl I-A26-B7-B12. The Al-B8 haplotype must have come from the mother, and thus
the paternal haplotype must be Al I-B12. Putative father A can be excluded because he does not
have the required paternal haplotype. Putative father B possesses AI I and B12, and he therefore
cannot be excluded. In this situation, with the antigens given, the probability that putative B is the
true father is 98.3%. Terasaki, supra note 43, at 546.
88. Miller, supra note 62, at 55.
89. Several laboratories in the United States perform HLA testing in cases of disputed pater-
nity. The following is a representative sample that is included only for the convenience of the
reader, who should infer no endorsement: Dr. J.F. Shaw, 615 Clinical Service Building, Univer-
sity of Alabama Medical Center, 619 S. 19th Street, Birmingham, Ala. 35233; Dr. Paul Terasaki,
Department of Surgery, University of California-Los Angeles, 1000 Veteran Avenue, Los Angeles,
Cal. 90024; Dr. Harvey Bernhardt, American Medical Laboratories, Inc., 4173 Roosevelt Blvd.,
Jacksonville, Fla. 32210; Dr. C.L. Lee, Charles Hymen Blood Center of Mt. Sinai Hospital Medi-
cal Center, 2746 W. 15th Street, Chicago, Ill. 60608; Dr. Wilma Bias, Immunogenetics Laboratory,
Johns Hopkins Hospital, 720 Rutland Avenue, Baltimore, Md. 21205; Dr. E.M. Berkman, New
England Medical Center Hospital Blood Bank, 171 Harrison Avenue, Boston, Mass. 02111; Dr.
Herbert F. Polesky, Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 2304 Park Avenue, Minneapolis,
Minn. 55404; Dr. William V. Miller, Missouri-Illinois Red Cross Blood Center, 4050 Lindell
Blvd., St. Louis, Mo. 63108; Dr. Fred H. Allen, Jr. and Dr. Leon N. Sussman, New York Blood
Center, Laboratory for Genetic Services, 310 E, 67th Street, New York City, N.Y. 10021; Dr. M.B.
Stroud, Medical Center Clinical Laboratory, Suite 178, 4499 Medical Drive, San Antonio, Tex.
78229; Dr. A.A. Hossaini, Medical College of Virginia, 1200 E. Broad Street, Richmond, Va.
23298. For a more complete state-by-state listing, see AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS,
SPECIAL SERVICES DIRECTORY 29-45 (1980). See also TEMPO No. NINE, supra note 48, at 5-21.
Persons who need the services of a laboratory for the performance of blood testing should con-
sider six factors before making a choice: (I) whether the laboratory performs sufficiently detailed
series of tests to exclude most wrongfully accused men; (2) whether it can handle the required
volume; (3) whether it has effective quality control techniques; (4) whether it provides clear reports
providing the probability of paternity if tests fail to exclude the alleged father, (5) whether it has
an expert who is prepared to testify at trial if he is needed; and (6) whether the cost of the labora-
tory's services is reasonable. Id at 1.
90. H. POLESKY, supra note 76, at 61; Miller, supra note 62, at 61.
91. TEMPO No. FouR, supra note 24, at 6.
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tures, makes the transfer of blood samples by ordinary mail difficult.92
Some laboratories therefore refuse mail-in blood specimens.93 Further-
more, the cost of HLA testing is, for a number of reasons, much greater
than that of other blood tests.94 The reagents necessary for HLA test-
ing are expensive and difficult to obtain.95 Extraction of white cells for
testing requires extra effort, and HLA testing takes two and one-half
times longer to complete than does red cell antigen testing.96
The accuracy of HLA obviously outweighs its disadvantages. Be-
cause the presence or absence of such highly probative evidence often
is outcome determinative, HLA's cost and difficulty of procurement are
justified. Yet the second recent breakthrough in blood testing technol-
ogy, the testing of red cell enzymes and blood serum proteins, provides
comparable accuracy and lacks many of HLA's disadvantages.
B. The Red Cell Enzyme and Blood Serum Protein Systems
The accuracy of the paternity determination depends largely upon
the number of genetic markers the analyst tests. The probability that
tests will exclude a falsely accused man increases as each additional
marker is tested.97 The interests of justice, for all parties involved,
therefore make it worthwhile to test additional polymorphic genetic
markers.98 Yet testing all of the immunologic and biochemical systems
92. Id
93. See Miller, supra note 62, at 61.
94. The cost of HLA testing varies widely among laboratories. Laboratories listing services
with the United States Department of Health and Human Services charge $150 to $900 for HLA
testing of three persons (mother, child, and putative father). Most charge between $300 and $500.
See TEMPO No. NINE, supra note 48, at 5-21. The cost of HLA testing, therefore, is generally
much higher than that of red cell antigen testing, see note 48 supra, or red cell enzyme and serum
protein testing, see note 121 infra.
95. The antisera required for HLA testing are "rare, expensive, and generally not avail-
able .... There are relatively few licensed reagents available, certainly not enough for complete
phenotyping." Miller, supra note 62, at 61, 63. The general unavailability of well-defined antisera
for HLA typing "is a major limitation of HL-A typing in paternity studies." H. POLESKY, supra
note 76, at 61.
96. Lascaris v. Lardeo, 100 Misc. 2d 220, 223, 417 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (Fam. Ct. 1979).
97. Lee, supra note 45, at 615.
98. See Sebring, Polesky & Schanfield, supra note 37, at 281. Additional testing clearly is in
the putative father's interest if it will exonerate him. If it will not, the child, the mother, and the
state benefit from the higher probability thus established that the accused actually is the father-
assuming that nonexclusionary evidence is admissible. See notes 175-87 infra and accompanying
text.
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that are of potential use99 is neither feasible nor practical. °0
Several red cell enzymes and blood serum proteins, however, have
proven useful in paternity testing. 101 Testing enzymes and proteins by
a process known as electrophoresis10 2 both provides first-hand exclu-
sion 10 3 and corroborates exclusions obtained by tests using other sys-
tems.1°4 Because enzymes and proteins possess well-established
99. At least 62 immunologic and biochemical systems are potentially useful in paternity test-
ing. AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 252. For data on the probability of exclusion for
individual genetic markers in black, white, and Japanese nonfathers, see id at 253-56.
100. It is not feasible routinely to test all genetic markers because the antisera required for
testing some of them generally are not available. Similarly, testing all markers would be impracti-
cal. Some markers are present in a large proportion of the population, and thus they provide a
low probability of exclusion. Therefore, the slight increase in the probability of exclusion would
not justify the extreme cost of testing all possible systems. Id. at 252, 254-56.
101. Several studies in both the United States and in Europe have demonstrated the viability
of red cell enzymes and serum proteins as determinants in cases of disputed parentage. See Dykes
& Polesky, Application of Testsfor Serum Proteins and Red Cell Enzymes in Determination of Par-
entage, in PATERNITY TESTING 42 (1978), and authorities cited therein. See also, e.g., Dykes &
Polesky, Properdin Factor B (B]) as an Exclusion Determinate in Parentage Testing, 30 HUMAN
HERED. 286 (1980); Dykes & Polesky, The Usefulness of Serum Protein and Erythrocyte Enzyme
Polymorphisms in Paterniy Testing, 65 AM. J. CLIN. PATH. 982 (1976); Grunbaum, Selvin, Myhre
& Pace, Distribution of Gene Frequencies and Discrimination Probabilities of 22 Human Blood Ge-
netic Systems in Four Racial Groups, 25 J. FOR. ScI. 428 (1980); Grunbaum, Selvin, Pace & Black,
Frequency Distribution and Discrimination Probability of Twelve Protein Genetic Variants in Human
Blood as Functions of Race, Sex, and Age, 23 J. FOR. Scl. 577 (1978); Sebring, Polesky &
Schanfield, supra note 37.
102. Dykes & Polesky, Application of Testsfor Serum Proteins and Red Cell Enzymes in Deter-
mination of Parentage, supra note 101, at 35. Electrophoresis is a process in which enzymes and
proteins separate under an electric current. Proteins take positive, negative, or neutral charges,
depending upon the solution in which they are placed. After placing the blood on an appropriate
medium, such as agar, the analyst subjects it to an electric field, and the charged protein molecules
migrate across the medium toward the pole of the opposite charge. Because blood proteins have
different sizes, shapes, densities, and charges, they vary in mobility. Electrophoresis separates
them into clear bands on the supporting medium. The analyst then applies indicator dyes that
unite with only one protein. In most cases, the pattern of separated proteins and the intensity of
the dyes identify the proteins present in the blood. Enzymes separate during electrophoresis in
much the same way and are identified by a chemical reaction that forms a colored compound
induced by the enzyme. See A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES 301 (2d ed. 1978); Grunbaum, supra note 74, at 3.
103. Dykes & Polesky, Application of Testsfor Serum Proteins and Red Cell Enzymes in Deter-
mination of Parentage, supra note 101, at 44. Dykes and Polesky found that "in actual practice
increasing the number of systems tested provides a larger than expected increase in the number of
individuals proven to be falsely accused." Dykes & Polesky, The Usefulness of Serum Protein and
Erythrocyte Enzyme Polymorphisms in Paternity Testing, supra note 101, at 986.
104. Dykes & Polesky, 4pplication of Testsfor Serum Proteins and Red Cell Enzymes in Deter-
mination of Parentage, supra note 101, at 35; Dykes & Polesky, The Usefulness of Serum Protein
and Erythrocyte Enzyme Polymorphisms in Paternity Testing, supra note 101, at 986.
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Mendelian inheritance patterns 105 and are reasonably polymorphic,10 6
they render with certainty a comparatively high probability of exclu-
sion. Furthermore, the following characteristics also make enzymes
and proteins extremely useful in paternity testing: they are identifiable
in newborn children, are not sex related, are stable in storage, and re-
main relatively unaffected by external factors. 07
Red cell enzyme and serum protein testing can equal or exceed HLA
in accuracy.' 0 8 Researchers have identified enough enzymes and pro-
teins to exclude a falsely accused man in more than ninety-five percent
of all cases.l19 It is neither practical" l° nor necessary, however, to test
them all. Testing only a few Wil yield a sufficiently high probability of
exclusion."' Eleven enzymes and proteins 12 produce an eighty-five
percent probability of exclusion.1 3 Enzyme-protein and red cell anti-
105. Dykes & Polesky, Application ofTests/or Serum Proteins and Red Cell Enzymes in Deter-
mination of Parentage, supra note 101, at 35.
106. See note 74 supra.
107. Dykes & Polesky, Application ofTests/or Serum Proteins and Red Cell Enzymes in Deter-
mination of Parentage, supra note 101, at 35.
Experts are not, however, in universal agreement about the usefulness of protein testing in new-
born children. One expert argues that protein electrophoresis is not useful in newborns because
many maternal proteins can pass from the mother to the child and remain present in the child for
several months. Letter from Dr. William V. Miller, Director, Missouri-Illinois Red Cross Blood
Center, to author (May 27, 1981) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
108. Letter from Dr. Benjamin W. Grunbaum, Research Biochemist, University of California-
Berkeley, to author (Dec. 3, 1980) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly). Com-
pare notes 80, 86 supra and accompanying text with notes 112-15 infra and accompanying text.
109. Letter from Dr. Leon N. Sussman, supra note 80.
110. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
11. Four serum proteins and seven red cell enzymes are particularly useful in paternity test-
ing: haptoglobin (Hp), transferrin (Tn, group-specific component (Gc), properdin factor B (Bf),
acid phosphatase (AcP), 6-Phosphogluconate dehydrogenase (6-PGD), phosphoglucomutase-1
(PGMI), adenylate kinase (AK), glutamic pyruvic transaminase (GPT), esterase-D (EsD), and
adenosine deaminase (ADA). TEMPO No. FoUR, supra note 24, at 7. Others that are useful
include Gm, Km, ceruloplasmin (Cp), and glyoxalase (GLO). See Dykes & Polesky, The Useful-
ness of Serum Protein and Erythrocyte Enzyme Polymorphisms in Paternity Testing, supra note 10 1,
at 985; Lee & Ying, Phenotyping of Eight Erythrocytic Enzymes in One Acrylamide Gel, 71 AM. J.
CLIN. PATH. 672, 672 (1979); Sebring, Polesky & Schanfield, supra note 37, at 284-85.
112. See note I II supra.
113. TEMPO No. FoUR, supra note 24, at 7. Sussman's list of probabilities places the cumu-
lative probability of exclusion at 85.3%. Letter from Dr. Leon N. Sussman, supra note 80.
The cumulative probability of exclusion that red cell enzymes and serum proteins provide de-
pends upon which, and how many, enzymes and proteins are tested. Lee and Ying tested eight
enzymes and proteins (PGMI, AK, 6-PGD, ADA, GLO, EsD, AcP, and GPT) and obtained
probabilities of exclusion of 55.6% for blacks and 66.3% for whites. Lee & Ying, supra note 111, at
672. The study that Dykes and Polesky conducted with nine enzymes and proteins (Hp, Gc, Cp,
Tf, AcP, PGMI, ADA, AK, and 6-PGD) produced a probability of exclusion of 60.38%. Dykes &
Polesky, The Usefulness of Serum Protein and Erythrocyte Enzyme Polymorphisms in Paternity Test-
ing, supra note 101, at 985. The use of 18 enzymes and proteins (Hp, Gm, Tf, Gc, Kin, Ag, ORO,
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gen testing combined' 4 yield a probability of exclusion as high as
ninety-seven percent. 115
The advantages of red cell enzyme and serum protein testing make it
"inevitable that the protein-enzyme systems will be used very exten-
sively as time goes on.""' 6 Unlike HLA and red cell antigen testing,
enzyme-protein testing can identify both common and rare variants." 7
The overall error rate of the blood enzyme system is approximately
one-half of one percent, while the error rate in testing cellular antigens,
including HLA, is about two percent. 118 Unlike HLA, 119 enzyme-pro-
tein tests need not be conducted within the twenty-four hour period
after sampling.120 Red blood cells are hardier and more stable than
white blood cells, and thus they may be mailed to a laboratory for test-
ing. Finally, enzyme-protein tests cost less than HLA.121
Enzyme-protein testing does, however, have two major disadvan-
tages. Because the process is relatively new, few laboratories presently
perform it.'"2 Moreover, none of the three appellate courts that have
C3, Bf, AcP, 6-PGD, PGM 1, AK, ADA, GPT, GLO, EsD, and PGP) will exclude a falsely ac-
cused man 95.7% of the time. Letter from Dr. Leon N. Sussman, supra note 80.
114. Both HLA and red cell enzymes and serum proteins usually are tested in conjunction
with red cell antigens, and they yield comparable results. The probability of exclusion of HLA
and red cell antigens is 98.79%. Letter from Dr. Leon N. Sussman, supra note 80. Use of 11
enzymes and proteins, see note 111 supra, in conjunction with red cell antigen tests produces a
somewhat lower probability of exclusion of 96.43%, and the testing of 18 enzymes and proteins,
see note I ll supra, along with red cell antigens results in a slightly higher 98.6% probability of
exclusion. Letter from Dr. Leon N. Sussman, supra note 80.
115. TEMPO No. FouR, supra note 24, at 7. Cf. Letter from Dr. Leon N. Sussman, supra
note 80 (96.43%).
116. Letter from Dr. Benjamin W. Grunbaum, supra note 108.
117. Id
[W]e can identify in a given system not only the common variants but also the rare
variants, using either specific chemicals or antisera. This is not true in the histocom-
patability testing for HLA or the red blood cell antigens where the detection is based on
the use of a specific antiserum for a specific antigen only.
Id
118. Id
119. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
120. TEMPO No. FouR, supra note 24, at 6. See text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
121. Laboratories listing services with the United States Department of Health and Human
Services charge $135 to $300 for enzyme-protein testing of three persons (mother, child, and puta-
tive father). Most laboratories conduct enzyme-protein tests only in conjunction with red cell
antigen tests and charge $210 to $750 for the combination. TEMPO No. NINE, supra note 48, at
5-12. The cost of enzyme protein tests is comparable to, and at times less than, that of red cell
antigen tests, see note 48 supra, and it is considerably less than that of HLA tests, see note 94
supra.
122. The following is a representative sample of laboratories that perform red cell enzyme and
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considered the admissibility of enzyme-protein test results as evidence
did so in the context of a paternity proceeding.1 23
II. VALIDATION OF NOVEL BLOOD TEST EVIDENCE
Courts have been very cautious about admitting scientific evidence.
Because judges generally have neither the qualifications nor the experi-
ence to determine the reliability of a particular scientific method, they
often are skeptical of claims that scientific proof is virtually infalli-
ble.124 They also fear that scientific evidence will overwhelm the jury,
causing uncritical lay jurors to accord it too much weight relative to the
other evidence."z As a result, most courts require stringent proof of
reliability in an effort to screen out unreliable novel scientific evi-
dence. 126 Although it would seem sufficient to prove the validity of the
underlying theory and the reliability of the instrument used to perform
the tests, 127 most jurisdictions impose a higher standard by requiring a
demonstration that both the theory and the instrument have gained
serum protein tests. It is included only for the convenience of the reader, who should infer no
endorsement: Dr. J.W. Morris, Memorial Hospital Medical Center, 2801 Atlantic Avenue, Long
Beach, Cal. 90801; Dr. R.E. Gaensslen and Dr. H.C. Lee, University of New Haven Forensic
Science Laboratory, West Haven, Conn. 06516; Dr. C.L. Lee, Charles Hymen Blood Center of Mt.
Sinai Hospital Medical Center, 2746 W. 15th Street, Chicago, IML 60608; Dr. Wilma Bias, Immu-
nogenetics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins Hospital, 720 Rutland Avenue, Baltimore, Md. 21205; Dr.
Herbert F. Polesky, Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 2304 Park Avenue, Minneapolis,
Minn. 55404; Dr. Fred H. Allen, Jr. and Dr. Leon N. Sussman, New York Blood Center, Labora-
tory for Genetic Services, 310 E. 67th Street, New York City, N.Y. 10021; Dr. E.W. Lovrien,
University of Oregon Health Science Center, Genetics Department, P.O. Box 574, Portland, Or.
97207; Dr. M.B. Stroud, Medical Center Clinical Laboratory, Suite 178, 4499 Medical Drive, San
Antonio, Tex. 78229; Dr. A.A. Hossaini, Medical College of Virginia, 1200 E. Broad Street, Rich-
mond, Va. 23298. For a more complete state-by-state listing, see AMERiCAN ASSOCIrAION OF
BLOOD BANKS, supra note 89, at 29-45. See also TEMPO No. NrNE, supra note 48, at 5-12.
123. See note 173 infra and accompanying text. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Hennepin
County Welfare Bd. v. Ayers, 304 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1981) (en banc), recently held that the
nonexclusionary results of enzyme-protein tests are admissible in a paternity action, but the court
addressed only the question of the admissibility of nonexclusionary test results and did not discuss
the validity of enzyme-protein testing. See note 172 infra and accompanying text.
124. E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENnTARY FOUNDATIONS 92 (1980).
125. Id
126. An in-depth discussion of the standards for admissibility of scientific evidence is beyond
the scope of this Note. For a comprehensive treatment of the standards and their inherent
strengths and weaknesses, see Giannelli, The4dmissibili y of Sclentc Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197 (1980); Comment, Changing the Standard
for the Admissibility of Novel Scientjfc Evidence State v. Williams, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 730 (1979).
127. E. IMWINKELRmD, supra note 124, at 91.
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general acceptance within the relevant scientific circle.' 28
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals first espoused the
general acceptance doctrine in Frye v. United States. 2 9 In Frye, the
court considered the admissibility of results of the systolic blood pres-
sure deception test, a forerunner of the polygraph. Refusing to apply
the normal foundational requirements for the introduction of expert
testimony to the admission of scientific evidence, the court noted the
difficulty in determining the validity of an underlying principle that is
not well-recognized.' 30 The court concluded that the systolic blood
pressure deception test was not sufficiently accepted among authorities
in the fields of physiology and psychology to allow admission of the test
results into evidence. 131
Three difficulties with the Frye formulation are readily apparent.
First, authorities disagree on what constitutes "the thing from which
the deduction is made."' 132 Some courts have said it is the underlying
scientific principle, others have said that it is the instrument itself,133
and Dean McCormick argues that it might be the qualifications of the
expert witness to interpret the data derived from the test.134 Second,
although the general acceptance standard requires neither unanimity' 35
nor infallibility, 36 at least one court has held the testimony of a single
128. The rule is one of competence based upon the supposed unreliability of the evidence.
Therefore, the questions of the validity of the underlying scientific theory, the reliability of the
instrument, and the general acceptance of both in the relevant scientific circles are ones of prelimi-
nary fact to be decided by the trial judge.
129. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
130. Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimen-
tal and the demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or dis-
covery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id at 1014.
131. Id
132. Id
133. Comment, supra note 126, at 761.
134. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 44, § 203, at 489.
135. Comment, supra note 126, at 761.
136. Courts have acknowledged that
[t]here is a probability factor in even the most carefully structured scientific inquiry;
seldom is it possible to exclude all possible chance for error in human endeavor. But
there is no requirement in our law that the admissibility of scientific-test evidence must
be predicated on a 100 percent degree of accuracy.
Phillips ex re. Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Utah 1980)
(quoting People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 625, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 70 (1978)). Thus, "neither
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expert insufficient to establish general acceptance,1 37 and another has
said that experts who vouch for a novel scientific theory must be "disin-
terested" so that their "livelihood [is] not intimately connected with"
the technique.' 38 Finally, adopting a broad definition of the relevant
scientific circle often will result in the exclusion of valid scientific evi-
dence, but adopting a narrow one may make it difficult for the oppo-
nent of the evidence to find qualified experts who oppose use of the
method. 139
Frye, therefore, is at best susceptible to a number of different and
inconsistent interpretations, leading courts to apply it selectively. 40
There nevertheless remains widespread support for the Frye
doctrine. 14 1
Some courts and commentators dissatisfied with the Frye standard
newness nor lack of absolute certainty in a test suffices to render it inadmissible in court. Every
useful new development must have its first day in court." United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431,
438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). See also United States v. Alexander, 526
F.2d 161, 163 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042, 1048 (1975).
137. Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277 (1977).
138. People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 376, 255 N.W.2d 171, 180 (1977).
139. Although the Frye standard helps prevent the admission of unreliable evidence, it may be
characterized fairly as a popularity contest more than an effective tool for the proper administra-
tion of justice. "A determination of reliability cannot rest solely on a process of 'counting (scien-
tific) noses.' . . . Selection of the 'relevant scientific community,' appears to influence the result."
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
Frye ensures widespread acceptance of scientific techniques and thus gives opponents greater ac-
cessibility to contradictory evidence. Yet it often frustrates justice by excluding proper, reliable
evidence, forcing the judicial system to lag perhaps several years behind current technology. See
Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (Mann, J., concurring) ("[s]ociety
need not tolerate homicide until there develops a body of medical literature about some particular
lethal agent"), appeal dismised, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
140. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 44, § 203, at 490; Giannelli, supra note 126, at 1228.
141. Eg, Exparte Dolvin, 391 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 1980); Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474 (Alaska
1970); Scales v. City Court, 122 Ariz. 231, 594 P.2d 97 (1979); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549
P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976); Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959); Salis-
bury v. State, 221 Ga. 718, 146 S.E.2d 776 (1966); State v. Linn, 93 Idaho 430, 462 P.2d 729 (1969);
Reid v. State, 267 Ind. 555, 372 N.E.2d 1149 (1978); State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d
986 (1981); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978); People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38
N.W.2d 322 (1949); State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1972); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37
N.W.2d 593 (1949); Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 NJ. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279 (1979); People v. Al-
ston, 79 Misc. 2d 1077, 362 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1974); State v. Steele, 27 N.C. App. 496, 219 S.E.2d 540
(1975); State v. Swanson, 225 N.W.2d 283 (N.D. 1974); State v. Smith, 50 Ohio App. 2d 183, 362
N.E.2d 1239 (1976); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, cert. denied, 342 U.S.
898 (1951); State v. Green, 271 Or. 153, 531 P.2d 245 (1975); Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d 206
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Woo, 84 Wash. 2d 472,527 P.2d 271 (1974); State v. Clawson, 270
S.E.2d 659 (W. Va. 1980).
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reject it in favor of a policy of general admissibility in which the ques-
tion of reliability relates to the credibility, rather than the competence,
of the evidence. The leading case is Coppolino v. State,142 which up-
held admission of the results of a scientific test formulated especially to
determine the cause of death in that murder prosecution. 43 Obviously
the medical profession had not generally accepted the test. Neverthe-
less the court held that the trial judge had not abused his "wide discre-
tion" in admitting the evidence.' 44 The court paid lip service to Frye
but stated that the "general rule" governing the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence is either the general acceptance test or "that the demon-
stration shall have passed from the stage of experimentation and
uncertainty to that of reasonable demonstrability., 145  Under Cop-
polino, therefore, the judge decides the validity of the underlying the-
ory, but the issue of reliability becomes a question for the jury. 46
Other state and federal courts147 and Dean McCormick 14 8 have en-
142. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dirmissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
143. Prosecution experts had designed the test to detect succinylcholine chloride. The state
attempted to prove that the defendant had murdered his wife by administering a lethal dose of the
chemical. Prior to the trial no test existed for detecting succinylcholine chloride in human tissues.
Id at 70, 75.
144. Id at 70.
145. Id
146. Judge Mann, concurring specially, explained that "[the expert witnesses were examined
and cross-examined at great length and the jury could either believe or doubt the prosecution's
testimony as it chose." Id at 75.
147. E.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117
(1979); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); State v.
Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975). The court
in Bailer held that
[uInless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes
its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific
evidence, in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be at-
tacked by cross-examination and refutation.
519 F.2d at 466.
148. Dean McCormick argues that the approach taken in Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dirmissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927
(1970),
should be followed in respect to expert testimony and scientific evidence generally.
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scien-
tific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant
conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless
there are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, probative value may be overborne by
the familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury, and undue consumption of
time. If the courts used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed requirement of
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dorsed this view. 149
Authority is split over whether the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
twenty states have adopted in various forms,1 50 embody the Coppolino
approach by eliminating judicial ability to create common-law compe-
tence rules. The language of the rules suggests such an adoption. Rule
402 provides that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,"151 with "rele-
vant evidence" defined in Rule 401 as "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."' 152 The standard for admissibility of scientific
evidence, therefore, would be the same as that for admissibility of ex-
pert opinion testimony under Rules 702 and 703.153 Yet most courts
"general acceptance" not elsewhere imposed, they would arrive at a practical way of
utilizing the results of scientific advances.
C. McCoRMicK, supra note 44, § 204, at 491 (footnotes omitted).
149. Various other commentators also have proposed standards other than the "general ac-
ceptance" rule. See, ag., Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Sc'entffc Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8
UTAH L. Rv. 313 (1963-64); Giannelli, supra note 126; Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibil-
ity of Sc/ent qc Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
150. To date, 20 states have adopted various forms of the Federal Rules: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. See Giannelli, supra note 126, at 1228.
151. FED. R. EVID. 402 provides:
Rule 402 Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible, Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
152. FED. R. EvID. 401.
153. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1200 n.l 1 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979). The rules for admissibility of expert opinion testimony provide:
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.
Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. Evm. 702, 703. The trial judge still maintains the residual discretion under FED. R. Evin.
403 to exclude the evidence on legal relevance grounds. The rule provides:
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or
Waste of Time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
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continue to apply Frye. It is arguable that the Federal Rules leave Frye
intact because, notwithstanding the language of the Rules, neither the
advisory committee's notes nor the legislative history repudiates it.' 54
Thus, although a few federal and state courts have said that the Rules
abrogate Frye,"' the majority adheres to the general acceptance doc-
trine.1 56 As a result, courts have been slow to admit novel blood test
evidence. 157
Recent decisions have eroded the barrier that Frye erects to the ad-
mission of HLA test results in disputed paternity cases. Courts apply-
ing the Frye test still may reach contrary conclusions, 5 8 but the trend
today is toward recognizing that HLA satisfies the general acceptance
requirement. 159  In 1979 the California court in Cramer v. Morri-
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
154. See Giannelli, supra note 126, at 1229.
155. At least two federal appellate courts have abandoned the general acceptance rule. United
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States
v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). Similarly, two state courts
have held that state rules of evidence modeled after the Federal Rules have abrogated the general
acceptance requirement. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1980); State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M.
184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
156. Four United States Courts of Appeals have reaffirmed the general acceptance doctrine
since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d
359, 363 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979); United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510
(9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mc-
Daniel, 538 F.2d 408, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Bowers, 534 F.2d 186, 193 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 & n.3 (8th Cir.
1975). Most states, including some that have adopted forms of the Federal Rules, adhere to the
general acceptance rule. See notes 141, 150 supra and accompanying text.
157. Although red blood cell antigen test results are well established as admissible evidence in
disputed paternity cases, see generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000, 1019-22 (1956), courts have be-
gun only recently to accept HLA and enzyme-protein testing as reliable. For example, although
HLA was used in paternity testing as early as 1972, Jeannet, Hsssig & Bernheim, supra note 66,
courts did not approve admission of HLA test results as evidence until 1979, see Cramer v. Morri-
son, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979); notes 160-62 infra and accompanying text.
158. See Comment, supra note 126, at 762. The author cites conflicting decisions on the ad-
missibility of spectographic voice identification results. The court in Hodo v. Superior Court, 30
Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973), found that sound spectography was generally ac-
cepted within the scientific community, but the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Tobey, 401
Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977), held that it was not.
159. Six of the nine states that have considered HLA test results have held them admissible:
Caifforni" e.g., County of Fresno v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 133, 154 Cal. Rptr. 660
(1979); Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979); Florida: Carlyon v.
Weeks, 387 So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Illinois: Miller v. Smith, No. 79-M1-185098 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Cook County May 27, 1980); New Jersey: Camden County Bd. of Social Servs. v. Kellner,
No. DR-466-76 (NJ. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Camden County Jan. 28, 1980); Malvasi v. Malvasi,
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son 160 sanctioned the use of HLA test results if the proponent could
demonstrate that HLA had gained general acceptance within the scien-
tific community, 6 I but it refused to decide the general acceptance ques-
tion pending a full hearing of the issue upon remand. 162
Subsequent cases have found that HLA is generally accepted within
scientific circles. In Goodrich v. Norman 163 a New York court held that
an alleged father has the right to have the court order HLA testing if
red cell antigen tests do not exclude him. The judge found that HLA
"is widely accepted in scientific communities because in cases involving
organ transplants it is used to match the donor and the recipient. Accu-
racy is essential when dealing with the lives of patients."'164 In Malvasi
v. Malvasi16 a New Jersey court found that the scientific community
had recognized the reliability and accuracy of HLA, and it therefore
granted the putative father's motion to compel the mother to undergo
167 N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279 (1979); New Yorl e.ag., Lascaris v. Lardeo, 100 Misc. 2d 220,
417 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Far. Ct. 1979); Goodrich v. Norman, 100 Misc. 2d 33, 421 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Far.
Ct. 1979); Washingtorn State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 738, 612 P.2d 795 (1980). The three states
that have refused to admit HLA test results have recognized the efficacy of HLA. They held
against admission on grounds other than reliability. Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Blazo, -
Mass. App. Ct. -, 406 N.E.2d 1323 (1980) (trial judge had discretion to exclude evidence); Utah:
Phillips ex rel Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (propo-
nents of evidence had not laid proper foundation for admission of evidence); Wisconsir J.B. v.
A.F., 92 Wis. 2d 696, 285 N.W.2d 880 (Ct. App. 1979) (nonexclusionary evidence inadmissible
under statute).
160. 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979).
161. In Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979), the trial judge had
granted the putative father's motion in limine to prevent introduction of HLA test results that had
not excluded him from paternity. The judge based his ruling on two grounds. He ruled that
nonexclusionary blood test results were inadmissible because California's version of the Uniform
Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, see note 188 infra, had eliminated the language al-
lowing the trial judge discretion to admit nonexclusionary test results depending upon the rarity of
the blood type involved. Second, he said that there was a possibility that statistical evidence
indicating a high probability that defendant was the father would have a prejudicial effect that
would outweigh its probative value. 88 Cal. App. 3d at 878, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68. The court of
appeals reversed, holding that HLA test results "are clearly probative and therefore relevant in an
action to establish paternity." Id at 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
162. The court assumed that HLA had gained general acceptance. Cramer v. Morrison, 88
Cal. App. 3d 873, 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865, 868 (1979). It expressly reserved judgment on the
question pending a full hearing on remand, however, because an uninformed appellate decision
finding admissibility would have "far-reaching implications" that would "establish a precedent
that would 'control subsequent trials, at least until new evidence is presented reflecting a change in
the attitude of the scientific community.'" Id at 888, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
163. 100 Misc. 2d 33, 421 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct. 1979).
164. Id at 37, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
165. 167 N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279 (1979).
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HLA testing.' 66 Finally, the Massachusetts court in Commonwealth v.
Blazo 167 upheld the trial judge's refusal to order the parties in a pater-
nity action to undergo HLA testing, but it recognized "the high level of
accuracy now attained from the HLA test and its recognition and gen-
eral acceptance by the scientific and medical community" since the
date of the trial. 168 Several other decisions have recognized the efficacy
of HLA.1
69
State legislatures also have circumvented the Frye obstacle by recog-
nizing the value of HLA as an aid in the determination of paternity.
166. The court said that HLA has "important probative value where paternity is in issue." Id
at 516, 401 A.2d at 280. See also Camden County Bd. of Social Servs. v. Kellner, No. DR-466-76,
slip op. at 12-13 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Camden County Jan. 28, 1980), in which the court
said:
It is incumbent upon trial courts, in order to further their search for the truth, to
employ scientific developments which will aid their discovery and which have achieved
acceptance in the scientific community....
. H.L.A. testing has been accepted in the scientific community. . . [and] has a high
degree of scientific reliability.
167. - Mass. App. Ct. - 406 N.E.2d 1323 (1980).
168. Id at -, 406 N.E.2d at 1326. The court held that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in refusing to grant the defendant putative father's motion that the court compel the
parties to undergo HLA testing. The motion was made and denied in 1975, before much of the
scientific proof of the reliability of HLA was available. Thus, the court said, "[t]he judge could
have determined on the record before him at the time. . . that the reliability of and general
acceptance of the HLA test had not been established." Id at -, 406 N.E.2d at 1325. Recognizing
the present general acceptance of HLA, however, the court said that whenever a putative father
requests HLA testing today, "the judge should carefully consider in the exercise of his or her
sound discretion ordering the administration of the HLA test to the defendant, the mother, and
the child." Id at _, 406 N.E.2d at 1326.
169. In Lascaris v. Lardeo, 100 Misc. 2d 220, 227, 417 N.Y.S.2d 665, 669 (Fam. Ct. 1979), the
New York court said that HLA "provides the best available scientific information to the court."
Miller v. Smith, No. 79-M1-185098, slip op. at 6 (IlM Cir. Ct. Cook County May 27, 1980), and
State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 738,-, 612 P.2d 795, 797 (1980) (en banc), similarly acknowledge
its high reliability. The Wisconsin court in J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d 696, 705, 285 N.W.2d 880, 884
(Ct. App. 1979), reluctantly refused to admit HLA test results because of a restrictive state statute
providing for admission of blood test evidence only when it excludes the putative father. In Phil-
lips ex rel. Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court said that given the greater reliability of HLA than that of red cell antigen tests,
HLA, "if otherwise admissible, should also be admissible." It held, however, that the proponent
had not established a sufficient foundation for admission of the evidence. The court laid down six
elements needed for a proper foundation: (1) the correctness of HLA's underlying genetic theory;
(2) the accuracy and reliability of the methods used to apply the theory; (3) the effect on the
accuracy of the test of nationality or ethnic origin of the subject; (4) other factors that might
influence probability of accuracy or invalidate the test altogether, (5) proof of proper procedure in
conducting the test, including the proper materials and equipment; and (6) proper qualifications of
the vouching expert witness. Id at 1235.
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Two states, Georgia and Indiana, recently enacted statutes that ex-
pressly permit the use of HLA testing in paternity proceedings. 170
When statutes specifically provide otherwise, the Frye general accept-
ance standard cannot bar admission of HLA evidence.
Frye should also impose no obstacle to the admission of red cell en-
zyme and serum protein test results in disputed paternity cases. Ex-
perts indicate that enzyme-protein testing is generally accepted within
relevant scientific circles.'71 One court has implicitly accepted the pro-
cess in a paternity proceeding, 172 and others have accepted it explicitly
in criminal prosecutions as a means of establishing that the defendant
170. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-306 (1981) provides:
74-306 Pretrial proceedings
As soon as practicable after an action has been brought the court upon motion of the
plaintifi, the defendant, or any other interested party, may order the mother, the alleged
father, and the child to submit to any blood tests, including human leukocyte antigen
(HLI) testing (f available, which have been developed or established for purposes of
disproving or proving parentage and which are reasonably accessible. If the court orders
such blood tests and if the action is brought prior to the birth of the child, the court shall
order the blood tests made as soon as medically feasible after the birth. The tests shall be
performed by a duly qualified licensed practicing physician, duly qualified immunolo-
gist, or other qualified person. The court may, upon motion by a party, order that in-
dependent tests be performed by other experts qualified as examiners of blood types. In
all cases, however, the court shal determine the number and qualifications of the ex-
perts. An order issued under this subsection is enforceable by contempt; except that if
the petitioner refuses to submit to an order for a blood test, the court upon motion of the
defendant may dismiss the suit.
(Emphasis added). IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-8 (Bums 1980) provides:
31-6-6.1-8. Order for medical tests. -Upon the motion of any party, the court shall
order all of the parties to the action to undergo either a blood grouping test or a Human
Leukocyte Antigen (HL4) tissue test. The tests shall be performed by a qualified expert
approved by the court, and the results of the tests may be received in evidence.
(Emphasis added).
171. Letter from Dr. Herbert F. Polesky, Director, Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, to author (Feb. 26, 1981) (on file with the Washington Universiy Law
Quarteriy); telephone interview with Dr. Benjamin W. Grunbaum, Research Biochemist, Univer-
sity of California-Berkeley (Feb. 25, 1981).
172. Hennepin County Welfare Bd. v. Ayers, 304 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1981) (en banc). In
Ayers, red cell antigen and enzyme-protein tests showed that there was a probability of 99.9% that
the appellee was the father of appellant's child. Brief of Appellant, Hennepin County Welfare Bd.
v. Ayers, 304 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1981), at app. 4. The trial court excluded the evidence, which
appellant proposed to use in order to prove that appellee was the father. The Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed and remanded, holding that whenever a proper foundation is laid for the evidence,
results of blood tests that do not exclude the putative father are admissible to show paternity. 304
N.W.2d at 882. Because the trial court had sustained appellee's objection to appellant's pre-trial
motion to admit the evidence, the supreme court did not have to reach the question of the validity
of enzyme-protein testing.
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committed the crime.173 For purposes of blood analysis, there is no
distinction between criminal prosecutions and paternity proceedings,
because the issue-identity-is the same in both. The fact that the use
of enzyme-protein tests is of relatively recent vintage and therefore not
widespread should not preclude the admission of enzyme-protein test
results. 174
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. The Rule and Alternatives
Many courts and state legislatures view the Frye requirement of gen-
eral scientific acceptance 175 as an inadequate safeguard in paternity
proceedings. Frye established a competence rule that helps to protect
the putative father in paternity cases from an adverse decision
grounded on erroneously admitted unreliable scientific evidence. The
rule, however, does not consider the possible prejudicial effect of ad-
mitting scientific evidence that satisfies the test for reliability. Both
courts and legislatures, therefore, have attempted to safeguard the pu-
tative father further by refusing to admit evidence of blood test results
that do not exclude the accused conclusively.176
This exclusionary rule resulted from the fear that evidence of nonex-
clusion might so color the paternity proceeding that the jury might de-
173. State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981); State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824 (Me.
1978); Robinson v. State, 47 Md. App. 558, 425 A.2d 211 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
174. [I]n an age when one scientific advancement tumbles in rapid succession upon an-
other and may be known only among a limited circle of scientists, we are not inclined to
adopt a standard that would deprive the judicial process of relevant scientific evidence
simply because it is of recent vintage or because knowledge of the principles... is
limited to a small but highly specialized group of experts. Tests that have passed from
the experimental stage may be admissible if their reliability is reasonably demonstrable.
... We do not intend, however, that a courtroom should be a forum of scientific
experimentation. Adjudication means fact-finding, and while speculation is not legiti-
mate in that process, a trier of fact should not be deprived of scientific data because some
controversy attaches to it. Management of doubt is a major aspect of our rules of proce-
dure and evidence, and that which reasonably leads to resolution of doubt and ascertain-
ment of truth should be adducible.
Phillips ex rel Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1234-35 (Utah 1980).
See also People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 862, 331 P.2d 251, 254 (1958), in which the
court said that the nalline test to detect narcotics "has been generally accepted by those who
would be expected to be familiar with its use. In this age of specialization more should not be
required."
175. See notes 128-31 supra and accompanying text.
176. See note 187 infra and accompanying text.
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cide the case on an improper basis.'77 The fear was once a rational
one. Most jurisdictions adopted the exclusionary rule when red cell
antigen tests were the only ones available for paternity testing. Because
red cell antigen tests provide a relatively low probability of exclu-
sion,178 the jury cannot accurately infer that a nonexcluded accused
man is actually the biological father.179 Nonexclusion by red cell anti-
gen tests is at best inconclusive, 80 and thus the "practical value" of red
cell antigen tests "is a negative one."18' States adopted the exclusion-
ary rule because they feared that the admission of such inconclusive
evidence, coupled with the deference that lay jurors often give scientific
evidence, 182 would unfairly prejudice the alleged father. 183
Although the fear of prejudice was reasonable, one may question the
wisdom of the exclusionary rule as applied to even nonexclusionary red
cell antigen test results. It seems more sound to admit the evidence and
allow the jury to consider it. The issue in a paternity proceeding is the
identity of the biological father, and evidence that blood testing failed
177. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), established an evidentiary compe-
tence doctrine based on the supposed unreliability of scientific techniques that have not gained
general acceptance within the relevant scientific circle. In contrast, the traditional rule that nonex-
clusionary blood test evidence is inadmissible is based upon considerations of legal relevance.
The argument is thus incorrect that "[t]he traditional approach falsely assumes that only evidence
which proves a disputed fact with certainty is admissible to prove that fact." Comment, The Use
of Blood Tests to Prove Paternity in California, 3 U.S.F.L. REv. 297, 302 (1969). Evidence that
blood tests have failed to exclude a putative father obviously is logically relevant to the determina-
tion of the question whether the accused is the biological father of the illegitimate child. See note
52 supra and accompanying text. It is excluded as legally irrelevant, however, because of the fear
that its admission as affirmative evidence of paternity will unfairly prejudice the accused father.
See notes 178-83 infra and accompanying text. FED. R. EVID. 403 codifies the legal relevance
doctrine. See note 153 supra.
178. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
179. An accused man not excluded by ABO testing, for example, nevertheless has only a low
probability of being the actual father. "Thus, for purposes of blood test evidence, any random
male could have been the father almost as easily as the nonexcluded putative father." Terasaki,
supra note 43, at 543.
180. Seeid
181. Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super. 513, 514, 401 A.2d 279, 279 (1979).
182. Jury deference to scientific evidence is a tenuous justification for the exclusionary rule.
Empirical studies suggest that it is false to assume that jurors unqualifiedly acquiesce in scientific
findings. See Carlson, Pasano & Jannuzzo, The Effect of Lie Detector Evidence on Jury Delibera-
tions: An Empirical Study, 5 J. POLICE ScI. & AD. 148 (1977); Markwart & Lynch, The Effect of
Polygraph Evidence on Mock Jury Decision-Making, 7 J. POLICE SCI. & AD. 324 (1979). See also
Tarlow, Admissibility ofPolygraph Evidence in 1975: .4nAidin Determining Credibility in a Peerury-
Plagued System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 928 (1975).
183. See Goodrich v. Norman, 100 Misc. 2d 33, 38, 421 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 (Faro. Ct. 1979).
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to exclude the putative father is clearly relevant to that inquiry. 8 4
Moreover, evidence with a basis in reliable scientific fact lends objec-
tivity to a proceeding that is otherwise highly subjective and often emo-
tional. 8 5  Any scientific evidence thus seems better than none. A
cautionary instruction to the jury regarding the weight of the evidence
would in most cases counter the danger of prejudice.'8 6 Nevertheless,
the exclusionary rule remains effective in at least twenty states.187
184. Dean McCormick argues that "[tihe question is one of identity. Every identifying mark
of the father, however common the trait, (so long as not universal) such as height, weight, color of
hair, is relevant, and it is from the accumulation of identifying traits that circumstantial proof of
identity gains its persuasive power." C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 44, § 211, at 522.
185. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text; note 203 infra and accompanying text.
186. The jury must be made acutely aware that the mere fact that blood tests have not ex-
cluded the accused is not dispositive. It should be informed of the percentage of the population
that possesses the same blood type as do the putative father and the child. Furthermore, the jury
must be told that it cannot disregard the other evidence in the case. If the evidence is nevertheless
too prejudicial, the trial judge always may exclude it in his discretion. See note 153 supra.
187. The majority of states has adopted the exclusionary rule by statute. ALA. CODE § 26-12-5
(1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-705.1 (1962); CAL. EvrD. CODE § 895 (Deering 1966); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46b-168 (1979); IDAHO CODE § 7-1115 (1979) (as construed by Isaacson v. Obendorf, 99
Idaho 304, 581 P.2d 350 (1978)); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1401 (Smith-Hurd 1980); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, § 66G (1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 273, § 12A (Michie/Law Co-op 1980); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 25A96(d) (1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-27 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:83-2, -3
(West 1976); N.Y. JUD.-CT. ACTS LAW § 532 (McKinney Supp. 1980); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3111.16 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 504 (West Supp. 1980); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. § 6136 (Purdon Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-228 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 48-7-8
(1980). The exclusionary rule in five of those states-California, Illinois, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
and Pennsylvania-is not found in the statutory language but, rather, is implied by the deletion or
change of the language contained in the uniform acts that would allow the judge discretion to
admit nonexclusionary blood test results. See note 191 infra and accompanying text. Three states
embrace the exclusionary rule by judicial decision. Simons v. Jorg, 375 So. 2d 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); T.A.L.S. v. R.D.B., 539 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); State ex rel Wollock v.
Brigham, 72 S.D. 278, 33 N.W.2d 285 (1948).
Courts disagree about the evidentiary weight to be accorded blood tests that conclusively ex-
clude the putative father. Three views exist. The majority of courts holds, with Dean McCor-
mick's approval, see C. McCoRMwcK, supra note 44, § 211, at 522, that blood tests that exclude the
putative father are conclusive on the issue of paternity. Eg., Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 620,
354 P.2d 657, 668-69, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129, 140-41 (1960); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 248-49 (Del.
Faro. Ct. 1978); Durfrene v. Durfrene, 366 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (La. App. 1978); Ross v. Marx, 21
NJ. Super. 95, 99, 90 A.2d 545, 546, affd, 24 N.J. Super. 25, 93 A.2d 597 (1952); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 1 A.D.2d 312, 316, 150 N.Y.S.2d 344, 348 (1956); State ex rel. Lyons v. De Valk, 47
Wis. 2d 200, 204, 177 N.W.2d 106, 108 (1970). In Ross, the court said that "[flor a court to declare
that these tests are not conclusive would be as unrealistic as it would be for a court to declare that
the world is fiat." 21 N.J. Super. at 99, 90 A.2d at 546. The second view is that exclusionary blood
test results are not conclusive but should be given great weight in the determination of paternity.
E.g., Beck v. Beck, 153 Colo. 90, 92-93, 384 P.2d 731, 732 (1963). The third view, the distinct
minority, is that exclusionary test results are merely ordinary evidence that the jury should con-
sider with other evidence in the case. E.g., People ex rel. De Vos v. Laurin, 73 IlL App. 3d 219,
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Two uniform acts provide a compromise between the strict exclu-
sionary rule and unqualified admissibility of nonexclusionary blood
test results. The Uniform Act on Paternity and the Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity allow the trial judge discretion to
admit nonexclusionary blood test results as affirmative evidence of pa-
ternity, depending upon the rarity of the child's and the putative fa-
ther's blood type.1 8  The judge probably would exclude evidence that a
nonexcluded accused father must have belonged to groups A, B, or 0,
which comprise ninety-seven percent of the population, but he likely
would admit evidence that the accused must have belonged to groups B
or AB, which comprise only thirteen percent.' 89 Nonexclusionary HLA
and enzyme-protein test results would be admissible in most cases be-
cause of the infrequency with which the genetic markers for those sys-
tems occur in the population. The Acts thus provide a more flexible
standard and yet maintain adequate safeguards for the accused. To-
day, seven of the twelve states that have enacted one or both of them
have adopted the language that allows judicial discretion in admitting
nonexclusionary blood test evidence. 190 The other five states, however,
223, 391 N.E.2d 164, 167 (1979); State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 152-53, 209 S.E.2d 754, 756-57
(1974). The most noted case is Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946), in
which blood tests showed that Charles Chaplin, the defendant, could not have been the father of
plaintiff's child. The court held, however, that the question was for the jury because the blood test
evidence conflicted with the plaintiff's testimony that she had sexual intercourse with Chaplin at
the critical conception time. Id. at 664-65, 169 P.2d at 451. The states, including California, that
have adopted various forms of the uniform acts, see notes 188-94 infra and accompanying text,
have abolished the Chaplin rule by providing that blood tests are conclusive whenever they show
that the accused could not be the biological father.
188. Both the Uniform Act on Paternity and the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine
Paternity provide:
If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence
based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of the child, the question
of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their findings or
conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the evidence. If the experts con-
clude that the blood tests show the possibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission
of this evidence is within the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of
the blood type.
UNFORM AcT ON PATERNrrY § 10; UNIFORM AcT ON BLOOD TEsTs TO DETERMINE PATERNrrY
§ 4.
189. See C. McCoRmicK, supra note 44, § 211, at 522-23.
190. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126(c)(III) (Supp. 1980); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 406.111
(Baldwin 1979); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 280 (1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 522:4 (1974);
OR. REv. STAT. § 109.258 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-14 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN.
78-25-21, -45(a)-10 (1977).
Seventeen other states allow admission of nonexclusionary blood test results as affirmative evi-
dence of paternity. Eight of them allow the jury to consider the fact of nonexclusion. Davis v.
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have retained the exclusionary rule by deleting or changing the
language. 191
The Uniform Parentage Act rejects the exclusionary rule entirely by
opting for unrestricted admission of nonexclusionary blood test results.
Section 12 provides in part that "[e]vidence relating to paternity may
include. . . blood test results, weighted in accordance with evidence, if
available, of the statistical probability of the alleged father's pater-
nity."' 92 The Act allows the jury not only to infer paternity from
nonexclusion but also to hear the expert's appraisal of the "probability
of paternity." '193 Presently, seven states have adopted section 12 of the
Uniform Parentage Act, and nine allow admission of probability
statistics. 194
Holloway, 265 S.E.2d 264 (S.C. 1980); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-847C (Supp. 1980); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 74-306, -307(a) (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-8 (Burns 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-131 (1974); Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.06 (Vernon Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 20-61.2 (Supp.
1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.23 (West Supp. 1980) (effective July 1, 1981). The remaining nine
states, the most liberal, allow the jury to consider the probability statistics that indicate the relative
chances of the alleged father's paternity. See note 194 infra.
191. CAL. EVtD. CODE § 895 (Deering 1966) (omits language giving judge discretion); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1401 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (changes language to allow only exclusionary test
results); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-27 (1972) (omits language giving judge discretion); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 504 (West Supp. 1980) (changes language to "[e]vidence of the 'possibility' of pater-
nity shall be inadmissible"); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6136 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (omits lan-
guage giving judge discretion).
192. UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 12(3). Section 12 provides five categories of admissible
evidence:
Evidence relating to paternity may include:
(I) evidence of sexual intercourse between the mother and alleged father at any pos-
sible time of conception;
(2) an expert's opinion concerning the statistical probability of the alleged father's
paternity based upon the duration of the mother's pregnancy;
(3) blood test results, weighted in accordance with evidence, if available, of the sta-
tistical probability of the alleged father's paternity;
(4) medical or anthropological evidence relating to the alleged father's paternity of
the child based on tests performed by experts. If a man has been identified as a possible
father of the child, the court may, and upon request of a party shall, require the child, the
mother, and the man to submit to appropriate tests; and
(5) all other evidence relevant to the issue of paternity of the child.
193. See note 192 supra. Introduction of the alleged father's probability of paternity involves
legal relevance problems not present in merely admitting evidence that blood tests failed to ex-
clude the accused. See notes 221, 224-31 infra and accompanying text.
194. Seven states have adopted § 12 of the Uniform Parentage Act. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-6-
113(c) (1978); HAwAu REV. STAT. § 584-12(3) (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.63(l)(c) (West
Supp. 1981); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §40-6-113(3) (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1417-11(3)
(Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.110(3) (Supp. 1980); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-110(iii)
(1978). Two other states allow admission of a calculated probability of paternity. NEv. REv.
STAT. § 56.020 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-7 (Supp. 1975), § 8-50.1(a),-(b) (Cur. Supp. 1979).
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The exclusionary rule clearly provides the greatest obstacle to the use
of blood test evidence, including HLA and enzyme-protein test results,
in disputed paternity cases. At least twenty states obstinately adhere to
it.'95 Advances in technology, however, have vitiated any need for re-
taining the rule.
B. Unjust#Fed Adherence to the Rule
The extreme accuracy of modern blood tests has made the exclusion-
ary rule obsolete. No longer is the failure of blood tests to exclude an
accused man inconclusive as to whether he is in fact the biological fa-
ther. When tests with a cumulative probability of exclusion of ninety-
seven to ninety-nine percent 196 do not exclude the accused, the jury
properly may infer that there is a high probability that he is the true
father. 197 In such cases, fear that the jury might wrongfully infer pater-
nity from evidence of nonexclusion 98 no longer justifies the exclusion-
ary rule. 199
Disenchantment with the rule has led several courts to use its under-
lying rationale as a means to circumvent the language of exclusionary
statutes. The rule was adopted to prevent the admission of inconclu-
195. See note 187 supra and accompanying text. The standard in six states-Alaska, Dela-
ware, Iowa, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Vermont-is unclear.
196. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
197. AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 260-61. "[lIt must be appreciated that the likeli-
hood of paternity is very high if [tests with a cumulative probability of exclusion of 90% or greater
fail] to obtain an exclusion. This fact coupled with the allegation of the mother makes the
probability ofpaterity... very high indeed." Walker, supra note 57, at 84. Tests with a cumu-
lative probability of exclusion of 97%, for example, will exclude 97 falsely accused men out of 100.
Thus, out of the 100, only two others besides the nonexcluded putative father are capable of being
the true father. When both the child and the putative father possess "an extremely rare inherited
biochemical variant" but the mother does not, the "single locus is sufficient to strongly incriminate
the putative father.... Tmhe same degree of improbability ... can also grow out of a collection
of polymorphic genetic systems." Chakraborty, Shaw & Schull, Exclusion of Paternity: The Cur-
rent State ofthe4rt, 26 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 477,485 (1974). The Uniform Act on Paternity
and the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity recognize the value of evidence that
blood tests have not excluded a putative father who possesses a relatively rare blood type. See
note 188 supra and accompanying text.
198. See notes 177-83 supra and accompanying text.
199. Abandonment of the exclusionary rule clearly depends upon the type of tests involved. It
is arguable that even nonexclusionary red cell antigen test results should be admitted if there are
proper procedural safeguards. See notes 184-86 supra and accompanying text. Obviously the rule
should not apply to highly accurate--and therefore highly probative-HLA and red cell enzyme
and serum protein test results.
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sive red cell antigen test results °.2 0 Therefore, the courts reason, the
rule should not apply to the results of highly probative tests, such as
HLA, that were nonexistent when the legislatures enacted it.20
1
Today the exclusionary rule provides too much protection for a puta-
tive father. Because of the usually small number of men whom a
mother can accuse in any one case, it is highly likely that a nonex-
cluded putative father is the biological parent. It is anomalous to deny
200. See notes 177-83 supra and accompanying text.
201. Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979); Carlyon v. Weeks,
387 So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Miller v. Smith, No. 79-M1-185098 (111. Cir. Ct. Cook
County May 27, 1980); Camden County Bd. of Social Servs. v. Kellner, No. DR-466-76 (N.J. Juv.
& Dom. Rel. Ct. Camden County Jan. 28, 1980). See also Phillips ex rel. Utah State Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
However proper the result, a decision to ignore the plain language of a statute creates a conflict
between judges and legislators. Whether judicial legislation is proper in the context of circum-
venting exclusionary statutes is a question that need not be resolved here. It suffices to say that
there are strong arguments supporting both sides. On the one hand, it is arguable that "[a] statute
must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as the court may think it
should or would have been written if the Legislature had envisaged all of the problems and com-
plications which might arise in the course of its administration." N.Y. STATUTES § 73 (McKinney
1971). The amount of protection to be afforded an accused father is more a question of public
policy than a rule of evidence, and courts might be wise to leave the decision to abandon the
exclusionary rule to the legislatures. Indeed, at least two courts have refused to ignore the clear
legislative mandate that nonexclusionary blood test results should not be admitted in paternity
proceedings. Goodrich v. Norman, 100 Misc. 2d 33, 421 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct. 1979); J.B. v.
A.F., 92 Wis. 2d 696, 285 N.W.2d 880 (Ct. App. 1979). Although one court has suggested that a
legislative rule proscribing the admission of nonexclusionary test results unconstitutionally vio-
lates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching upon the prerogative of the courts,
Miller v. Smith, No. 79-M1-185098, slip op. at 6 11 Cir. Ct. Cook County May 27, 1980), circum-
vention of exclusionary statutes under the guise of "interpretation" is little more than judicial
usurpation of the legislative function.
On the other hand, it is arguable that courts must be able to assess the interpretative intent of
the legislature in order to give flexibility to the law. Because the legislature might not, or could
not, have foreseen subsequent developments, literal interpretation of statutes often produces an
inflexible standard that is unworkable in changing times. Moreover, the process of ascertaining
interpretative intent is hardly foreign to the courts. It occurs frequently in a variety of contexts.
In commercial settings, for example, judges must determine the intent of the parties in order to
decide whether they actually intended to create a contract and, if so, to determine its terms. See
U.C.C. § 2-204(3). In constitutional adjudication, courts cannot rely upon the intent of the fram-
ers in deciding issues such as the constitutionality of electronic surveillance techniques, see Irvine
v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), or television cameras in the courtroom, see Chandler v. Flor-
ida, 101 S. Ct. 802 (1981); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), because it is clear that the framers
never could have anticipated them. Thus, courts should be allowed to carry out the process of
interpretation for which they are uniquely suited.
Given the potential for controversy and the difficulties inherent in attempting to ascertain inter-
pretative legislative intent, the legislatures should reconsider the question and declare present pol-
icy in order to resolve the dispute.
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admission of highly probative nonexclusionary blood test results in pa-
ternity proceedings but allow it in criminal cases in which the stakes
may be considerably higher.2"2 The nongenetic evidence in a paternity
case often consists of little or nothing more than the biased testimony
of the mother and the putative father.20 3 Exclusion of blood test evi-
dence may therefore create a subjective credibility contest that obfus-
cates the truth and results in a miscarriage of justice. It would be far
better to admit the evidence, provided there are adequate procedural
safeguards.2 4
The question is one of establishing a priority for the interests in-
volved. The mother, the putative father, and the state certainly have
interests in the outcome of the paternity proceeding.20 5 The child,
though, is the primary beneficiary of the determination of parentage.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have struck down distinctions be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate children.2 "6 Refusing to allow blood
test evidence to prove paternity, while admitting it for disproval, seems
to offend the policy of granting equality to illegitimates.207 One court
has suggested that refusing to admit nonexclusionary blood test results
202. See Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1945). In Shanks, there was
evidence that type 0 blood found on defendant's coat was the same type as the victim's blood.
The court noted that approximately 45% of the population possesses type 0 blood, id at 445, 45
A.2d at 88, but it rejected defendant's contention that the blood test evidence and the other evi-
dence was too remote to be admissible:
[Neither the blood test evidence nor the other corroborative evidence], standing alone,
would prove conclusively that appellant was the guilty man, but taken together they
constitute a chain of circumstantial evidence tending to. . . support the inference that
the accused was the person who committed the crime.
The objection of remoteness goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its ad-
missibility. To exclude evidence merely because it tends to establish a possibility, rather
than a probability, would produce curious results not heretofore thought of. . . . Simi-
lar evidence [to that placing defendant near the scene of the crime] has never been ques-
tioned as being too remote. That is a question of weight to be determined by the court or
the jury.
Id at 446-47, 45 A.2d at 89.
The prosecution must prove criminal charges beyond a reasonable doubt, but the proponent in
a civil paternity proceeding needs only a preponderance of the evidence in order to prevail. E.g.,
G.L. v. S.D., 403 A.2d 1121 (DeL 1979); State ex rel Brown v. Middleton, 259 Iowa 1140, 147
N.W.2d 40 (1966). The difference in the burden of proof, however, is irrelevant in deciding
whether to admit nonexclusionary blood test evidence. The issue--the question of identity-is the
same in both contexts.
203. See, eg., B.S.H. v. JJ.H., 613 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
204. See note 186 supra and accompanying text.
205. See notes 22-26, 30-37 supra and accompanying text.
206. See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text.
207. See Comment, supra note 177, at 310.
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"might be in violation of due process of law."20
The decision to admit nonexclusionary blood test results necessarily
involves a determination of the scope of admissibility. Two alterna-
tives exist. The first is to allow the jury to consider the fact of nonex-
clusion in the context of the probability that the given test systems
would have excluded the putative father if he were falsely accused.
The second, more dangerous and controversial, is to admit the expert's
determination of the probability that the accused is the true father.
Abandonment of the exclusionary rule requires, at base, that the jury
be allowed to draw inferences from the fact that blood testing did not
exclude the putative father. The likelihood that the accused is the true
father increases proportionately with increases in the cumulative
probability of exclusion of the test systems employed.20 9 The chance
that the accused is the actual father is therefore greater if the
probability of exclusion is ninety-five percent than if it is eighty-five
percent. Under this approach, the jury itself must assess the raw data.
The value of the HLA and enzyme-protein systems, however, lies in
their ability to enable the analyst to calculate a relatively certain math-
ematical probability that the accused is the actual father.210  The
probability ofpaternity is extrapolated from evidence of nonexclusion.
Dangers inhere in the use of the probability of paternity, but it is, when
properly calculated,21 the most effective method for "assess[ing] the
likelihood associated with the failure of genetic evidence to give a con-
clusive answer. '212 When stated as a percentage, the probability of pa-
ternity provides the jury with an effective tool for resolution of
parentage questions.
The Uniform Parentage Act recognizes the value of statistical evi-
dence indicating probability of paternity. It codifies the practice that
European courts have used for several years213 by allowing admission
208. Goodrich v. Norman, 100 Misc. 2d 33, 39, 421 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289 (Fam. Ct. 1979).
209. The probability of exclusion of a given blood test system is the percentage chance that
testing with that system would have excluded a falsely accused man. See note 47 supra and ac-
companying text.
210. See Lee, supra note 12; Lee, Lebeck & Wong, supra note 76; Walker, supra note 57.
211. No one method exists for calculating the probability of paternity. At least one cannot be
used because it would unfairly prejudice the putative father. See note 221 infra and accompany-
ing text. The American Association of Blood Banks is planning an international workshop for
1982 in an effort to standardize the approach to the problem. Letter from Dr. William V. Miller,
supra note 107.
212. Grunbaum, Selvin, Myhre & Pace, supra note 101, at 428.
213. See Krause, The Uniform ParentageAc, 8 FAm. L.Q. 1 (1974); Lee, supra note 12, at 523.
[Vol. 59:977
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of "blood tests results, weighted in accordance with evidence, if avail-
able, of the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity. '21 4
The American Medical Association and the American Bar Association
also recommend that a blood test report that includes an estimation of
the probability of paternity "be received in evidence by stipulation of
the parties or by order of the court."21
The probability of paternity expresses as a percentage the chance
that the nonexcluded accused is the true father compared to the chance
that either the accused or a random man is the true father.2 16 Using
known frequencies of genetic markers in the population, 17 the analyst
calculates the chance that the mating of either the mother and the al-
leged father or the mother and a random man would produce a child
with the genetic markers in question.21 8 Using these data, the
probability of paternity can be determined simply219 by applying the
Essen-Moller version of Bayes' Theorem.2 0 Unlike Bayes' Theroem,
which has been criticized, the Essen-M61ler formula properly leaves the
214. UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 12(3). See note 192 supra for the full text of§ 12. To date,
seven states have adopted § 12 of the Uniform Parentage Act. See note 194 supra.
215. AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 283.
216. Terasaki, supra note 43, at 549. The probability of paternity is not necessarily equivalent
to the probability of exclusion. Because the two are calculated differently, cases in which they
might be equal arise merely by coincidence. The probability of exclusion merely expresses the
chance that a given system of genetic markers will exclude a falsely accused man. See note 47
supra. The probability of paternity expresses the chance that a nonexcluded putative father can
pass the given genetic markers in relation to the chance that either the putative father or a random
man could pass them. See notes 217-21 infra and accompanying text.
217. For figures on gene, phenotype, and haplotype frequencies for HLA testing, see Miller,
upra note 62, at 57-58; AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 273-75. For data on phenotype
and gene frequencies for enzyme-protein testing, see Grunbaum, Selvin, Myhre & Pace, supra
note 101, at 437-38; Grunbaum, Selvin, Pace & Black, supra note 101, at 582-83.
Gene frequencies vary significantly among various races. It is therefore necessary to know the
racial background of the parties involved in order to obtain an accurate determination of the
probability of paternity. The analyst should also consider the "possibilities of genetic variances,
phenotypes missing from a survey of a small population, and mixed racial heritage." Lee, supra
note 12, at 533.
218. Six assumptions are inherent in the probability determination: (1) that the mother is the
biologic mother, (2) that no mutations have affected the blood group genes; (3) that each party
(mother, child, and putative father) was positively identified; (4) that no clerical errors have oc-
curred in labeling the specimen tubes, aliquoting the specimens, and recording the results; (5) that
the reagents used in the tests were potent and specific; and (6) that all tests were performed prop-
erly with attention to detail and correct procedures. Walker, supra note 57, at 69.
219. The calculation "can be easily accomplished with the help of a calculator for routine
purposes or with a computer for a large workload." Lee, Lebeck & Wong, supra note 76, at 222.
220. See text accompanying note 216 supra. The Essen-Maler formulation of Bayes' Theo-
rem is relatively simple:
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task of weighing the genetic and nongenetic evidence to the jury, be-
cause it focuses solely on the genetic probabilities without considering
nongenetic evidence.221
X 1
W - X+Y Y
1+-
X
where W is the probability of paternity, X is the chance that the accused could pass the genetic
markers involved, and Y is the chance that a random man could pass the genetic markers in-
volved. See Walker, supra note 57, at 84-87. See also AMA-ABA Guideines, supra note 4, at 260-
62. For example, assume that X=0.25 and Y=0.0543. The formula yields the following result:
0.25W=
0.25 + 0.0543
0.0543
1+-
0.25
1.2172
- .8216 or 82.16%
The probability of paternity is thus 82.16%, and the probability of nonpaternity is 100%-82.16%, or
17.84%. See Lee, Lebeck & Wong, supra note 76, at 222.
The theorem has both its opponents and proponents. In Langaney & Pison, Probability of Pa-
ternity: Useless, 27 Am. J. HUMAN GENETICS 558 (1975), the authors argue that "classical statisti-
cal testing using paternity probabilities does not allow safe decisions in cases of disputed
paternity." Id at 560. They contend that "[t]he only potential interest of the Bayesian probability
method concerns the nonexcluded putative fathers .... IThe method is powerless and should
not be used because the risks of error are unacceptably high." Id But see Valentin, Statistical
Evidence in Paternity Cases: Imperative, 28 AM. . HUMAN GENETICS 620, 621 (1976) ("a state-
ment in a paternity case that a particular man is highly likely (or unlikely) to be the true father,
based on Bayesian calculations, will seldom be erroneous").
221. The Essen-Mller version of Bayes' Theorem therefore is not amenable to the criticism
leveled at Bayes' Theorem itself in Ellman & Kaye, supra note 34. In order to use Bayes' Theo-
rem, one first must derive a probability from the nongenetic evidence. Bayes' Theorem is then
used in order to demonstrate the impact of the genetic evidence on that prior probability. The
article criticizes the use of Bayes' Theorem because the final determination of the probability of
paternity is predicated upon the analyst's assessment of the probability resulting from the
nongenetic evidence. The authors conclude that giving the jury a single numerical expression of
the probability of paternity will unfairly prejudice the putative father. Id at 1149-52.
The criticism of Bayes' Theorem is valid, because "[tihe question of prior probability. . . does
not apply to paternity testing." Letter from Dr. C.L. Lee, Director, Charles Hymen Blood Center
of Mt. Sinai Hospital Medical Center, Chicago, Illinois, to author (Jan. 29, 1981) (on file with the
Washington University Law Quarterly). One analyst indicates that he begins with a prior 50-50
probability--assuming that the accused "is as likely as not, on the basis of other evidence, to be
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/14
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Calculation of the probability of paternity offers a number of advan-
tages. The most obvious is the fact that it is extremely probative on the
question of the identity of the biological father, the central issue in a
paternity proceeding.2" Second, all of the parties involved can easily
understand the meaning of the term "probability of paternity."
Knowledge of genetics is not essential, because only simple genetic
rules are involved and the probabilities for individual genetic markers
have been published. Finally, the calculation considers the genetic
composition of both the mother and the child, factors that greatly influ-
ence the determination of paternity.3
Submitting statistics to the jury always poses the danger that the evi-
dence may overwhelm or mislead the jurors and unfairly prejudice the
putative father. Testimony that there is a high probability that the ac-
cused is the biological father can be irreparably damaging. Because the
evidence is "scientific," lay jurors may be tempted to accord it exagger-
ated weight. Furthermore, the distinction between the probability of
exclusion and the probability of paternity may confuse the jury.
Arguably, testimony concerning the probability of paternity would
the biological father"--and "leave[s] it to the jury and the attorneys to factor in their assessment
of the strength of the other evidence and to arrive at an overall assessment." Letter from Dr. Ray
Mickey, UCLA School of Medicine, Los Angeles, California, to author (Feb. 18, 1981) (on file
with the Washington University Law Quartery). The argument fails for three reasons. First, the
putative father can never win. The only real controversy exists when the accused is not excluded.
If one begins with a 50-50 prior probability, the fact of nonexclusion--the only reason for the case
to be contested-automatically moves the probability above the 50% mark and thus satisfies the
plaintiff's burden of proof. Second, there appears to be no basis for the 50-50 assumption. Ellman
& Kaye, supra note 34, at 1150. Allowing the expert to base his conclusion upon a probability for
which there is no foundation may prejudicially mislead the jury. See People v. Collins, 68 CaL 2d
319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968) (reversing the trial court's admission of evidence, based
upon unfounded prior probabilities, that chances were 1/12,000,000 that another interracial
couple could have possessed all the characteristics of the defendants). Third, although it is con-
ceded that the probability based upon the 50-50 assumption is only a probability of paternity and
not the probability of paternity, letter from Dr. Ray Mickey, supra, the jury may not fully under-
stand the distinction, and the putative father may thus be unduly prejudiced.
222. Professor Hummel's interpretation of the numerical probabilities is helpful in clarifying
the meaning of the raw data. He suggests the following characterization of the evidence:
PROBABILITY LIKELIHOOD OF PATERNITY
99.80%-99.90% Practically proved
99.10%-99.75% Extremely likely
95.00%-99.00% Very likely
90.00%-95.00% Likely
80.00%-90.00% Undecided
Less than 80.00% Not useful
AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 262.
223. Lee, supra note 12, at 523.
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prejudice the accused no more than would other types of scientific evi-
dence224 and, in any event, presents a better alternative to the present
system.225 Allowing the jury to draw its own inferences from statistics,
however, creates problems of jury control not present with other cate-
gories of scientific proof such as breathalyzer or fingerprint evidence.
Courts therefore should admit statistics only if there are adequate pro-
cedural and substantive safeguards to ensure that the evidence is relia-
ble and that the jury is able to assess it objectively.
Procedurally, the trial judge should require a strong foundation
before admitting statistical evidence. Forcing the proponent to show
that the analyst was fully qualified to perform the tests minimizes the
chance that an overzealous analyst might submit inaccurate data.226
Concomitantly, there must be a showing that the analyst conducted the
tests properly, using antisera with a high degree of potency and speci-
ficity.227 The blood test report should be highly detailed as to both the
224. One court has argued that "[i]t certainly cannot be said that the admission of a positive
finding of paternity would... create substantial danger of undue prejudice any more than any
probative relevant scientific evidence such as breathalyzer, VASCAR, fingerprints, etc.. . . Mhe
probative value of the probability of paternity outweigh[s] its possible prejudicial effect." Camden
County Bd. of Social Servs. v. Kellner, No. DR-466-76, slip op. at 16 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. ReL Ct.
Camden County Jan. 28, 1980).
225. Evidence of physical resemblance of the child to the putative father is sometimes admit-
ted, and it is anomalous to argue that blood test results, which "can also be used to show 'physical
resemblance' between the child and the alleged father," would more confuse the jury and there-
fore should be excluded. Comment, supra note 177, at 306.
There can be no logical distinction made between the evidence of physical resem-
blance which is corporeal and visible to the jury and resemblance which is chemical and
must be shown by the use of tests.... mhe only distinction that could be made is that
the tests showing chemical resemblance are more objective, as they are not influenced by
any subjective attitudes held by the jurors. . . . [I]n the case of corporeal physical re-
semblance, the inheritance of many of the traits which make up a person's general ap-
pearance is not well known, and it is not known how frequently the traits appear in the
population.... The admission of such corporeal resemblance is therefore, more likely
to mislead the jury than is the chemical resemblance shown by the tests. The inheritance
of chemical traits is well known, and for most of them it is known how frequently they
appear in the population. For these reasons, the evidence of the tests should not be
excluded as tending to confuse or mislead the jury.
Id at 306-07.
226. L. SussMAN, upra note 34, at 129-30. According to Sussman,
[t]he number of errors which occur can be kept at a minimum only if every expert con-
sulted by the courts limits his report to those tests for which that expert is fully qualified
by study and experience. Unfortunately, there are experts who seem unable to resist the
temptation to carry out tests... which they are not fully qualified to do, in order to
make their report as "complete" as possible.
Id
227. Id at 129.
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expert's findings and the bases for his opinion so that few questions, if
any, are left unanswered.228 Finally, unless the parties stipulate other-
wise, the written report must be introduced by live sponsoring testi-
mony so that the jury can hear the expert's explanation and evaluate
his credibility and so that the opponent has an opportunity for cross-
examination.229
Substantively, the expert should explain clearly the difference be-
tween the probability of exclusion and the probability of paternity230 in
order to minimize the possibility that the jury will misinterpret the sta-
tistical data. In addition, the judge should emphasize that the jury
must consider all the evidence in the case. Such an instruction would
help prevent the jury from giving undue weight to the probability of
paternity in making the final determination. As a final check, the judge
could allow admission of blood test results only to corroborate in-
dependent evidence, such as testimony that the putative father had sex-
ual relations with the mother at the critical time.23 The use of these
safeguards largely negates the probative danger of admitting evidence
of the probability of paternity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Blood testing today is a highly accurate science that can greatly assist
courts in the resolution of disputed parentage questions. Both HLA
228. AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 4, at 282.
229. Courts should not always require that the expert who testifies be a licensed physician.
Schedule exigencies dictate that physicians not spend a significant amount of time in court. Were
they required to do so,
the medical profession would not be of much help and we would have to bow out of the
field. None of us [has] the time or inclination to spend all of our time in court. [If], on
the other hand, testimony of technicians and technologists could be permitted, the situa-
tion would be more manageable.
Letter from Dr. William V. Miller, supra note 107. Laboratory technicians routinely perform
paternity testing, and their testimony would suffice if they could demonstrate that they were quali-
fied not only to perform the tests but also to explain the underlying theory and interpret the test
results.
Courts should also be more willing to admit the evidence without live sponsoring testimony if
the trial is to the court rather than before a jury. In such instances there is less danger of prejudice
to the putative father, because judges are less likely than lay jurors to misunderstand the nature
and limitations of the evidence.
230. See note 216 supra and accompanying text.
231. Comment, supra note 177, at 308. Restricting the use of blood test results to corrobora-
tion of independent evidence "would prevent the mother from using any previous knowledge of
the genetic make-up of the defendant ... and would prevent a 'trial by mathematics' without any
other evidence." Id See also 16 J. FAm. L. 537, 540-41 (1978).
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and red cell enzyme and blood serum protein testing have proved relia-
ble to an extraordinary degree. Courts have recognized that HLA is
generally accepted within the medical profession as a viable method for
paternity testing, and HLA results therefore should be admitted rou-
tinely in disputed paternity proceedings. Likewise, courts have recog-
nized the general acceptance of enzyme-protein testing in other
contexts, and they should adopt a policy of admission in paternity pro-
ceedings as well.
Given the extreme accuracy of HLA and enzyme-protein testing,
rules rendering nonexclusionary blood test evidence inadmissible are
obsolete. Today a falsely accused putative father can be excluded from
paternity in excess of ninety-nine percent of all cases. When extensive
testing fails to exclude an accused man, there usually exists a high
probability that he is indeed the biological father. Evidence of nonex-
clusion, therefore, is highly probative on the question of the true fa-
ther's identity, and it should not be withheld from the jury.
Exclusionary statutes should be either repealed or narrowly construed,
and cases adopting the exclusionary rule should be over-ruled.
Finally, courts should allow the jury to consider the probability of
paternity. The calculation provides the most easily understood ex-
planation for the failure of blood tests to exclude the accused. When
attended by appropriate safeguards, the probative value of the
probability of paternity outweighs any possible probative danger.
Richard Lane Schnake
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